

# The MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Captain Frank E. Evans, U. S. Marine Corps, Retired, Editor.

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# The MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

VOLUME I.

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## THE MOBILE DEFENSE OF ADVANCE BASES BY THE MARINE CORPS.

Colonel John A. Lejeune, U. S. M. C.

THE field service regulations make it mandatory to *estimate the situation*. In estimating the situation, the first thing to be considered is the *mission* of the military force concerned. The study of logic teaches us that the correctness of the conclusion depends primarily upon the soundness of the premises. The most important factor then in this estimate of the situation is the determination of the *true mission* of the Marine Corps in the event of war.

The countries with which the United States may become involved in war may be divided roughly into two classes. First: great naval powers; second: powers weak in naval strength. A war with a nation belonging to the first class means that the military shore forces of the two nations must (unless the territory of the two be contiguous, as in the case of Great Britain and the United States) remain inactive and unused until the two fleets have settled the momentous question of supremacy at sea. The Army can take no active part in the hostilities until the path across the sea has been opened and one nation or the other is able to assume the offensive.

In such a war the Marine Corps, if not assigned to Advance Base work, would in all probability be divided up into small detachments and either assigned to the vessels of the fleet, or held on shore in a state of inactivity as guards to navy yards, naval magazines, etc., while waiting for the war at sea to reach a decision. If, on the contrary, the Marine Corps be utilized as an Advance Base organization, it would have the opportunity to share with the Navy

Lecture delivered to officers of Advance Base School, Philadelphia, in May, 1915.  
This paper is based very largely on Captain Earl Ellis' lectures on Advance Bases.

the glory always resting on those who strike the first blows at the enemy, and it also would have the satisfaction of feeling that it had an important, semi-independent duty to perform and that on the manner of its performance would largely depend the success or failure of the Fleet.

Surely, this is a mission which is worth while, and one which furnishes a spur to energetic effort and zealous labor in time of peace, so as to attain the true soldier's Elysian state, "preparedness for war."

In the event of a war with a non-naval power, our duties, if organized into regiments and brigades for Advance Base training, would be that of the advance guard of an army. The Marine Corps would be the first to set foot on hostile soil in order to seize, fortify, and hold a port from which, as a base, the Army would prosecute its campaign. Here being again first on the scene, the Corps would perform most valuable service, and would be ready to join the Army in its march against the armies of the enemy.

All, I believe, will agree that our training as an Advance Base organization, both as a mobile and as a fixed defense force, will best fit us for any or all of these roles, and that such training should, therefore, be adopted as our special peace mission.

I think there is some confusion, however, in the mind of the ordinary Marine officer like myself, as to the meaning of the term "Advance Base." As I understand the subject, the meaning of these words is too narrow to represent correctly the mission of this Brigade. Naval bases are classified in several ways. For our purposes the questions as to whether they are permanent or temporary, advance, or on the line of communications, or at home, etc., etc., are not of as much importance as the question as to whether they are defended or undefended. It is my belief that the Marine Corps may be called upon to defend an undefended or partially defended naval base, or other important point on the coast irrespective of whether or not it be, strictly speaking, an advance base.

This view I know is not in accord with the prevailing conception of the duties of an advance base organization; but wars nowadays come with the suddenness of a magazine explosion, and a fully equipped, heavily armed, highly mobile and well trained organization such as is this First Brigade, might unquestionably be called on to defend any important base or harbor from attack.

The question now arises as to what part will the mobile force, as such, take in the carrying out of the Marine Corps mission.

From the standpoint of the Mobile Force, its activities vary but little whether the base be naval or military—permanent or temporary; advance or retired, etc., etc. Its problem is always the same old one, viz: the defense of a particular locality against the attack of a hostile mobile force supported by naval vessels. There is no mystery connected with the solution of this problem. A city, or a coast defense battery, or a harbor filled with shipping, is to be protected from attack. To furnish this protection, the enemy must be prevented from occupying any position from which his artillery may be able to throw its projectiles into the city, the fort or the harbor.

Owing to the greatly increased range and power of modern artillery, the enemy must be held at a greater distance from the goal he seeks than formerly, and our defenses must be of such a nature as to give our troops protection against the enemy's modern and more powerful naval or land batteries. Conversely, the increased power of modern artillery, as well as its greater security by reason of its defiladed positions, makes successful landings and hostile infantry attack much more difficult, and the problem of the defense correspondingly easier.

So far as the mobile force is concerned, the character of the defense of localities or bases may be roughly divided into two classes: insular and continental.

By an insular base, fort, city or other locality, is meant one so situated that the attacking force can be met at the beach, there being no landing places beyond the radius of activity of the defending force. A modified insular position is one located on a small peninsula connected with the mainland by a narrow causeway, making it necessary for the enemy either to land in the face of the defending force or else to cross the narrow causeway under the defender's fire.

By a continental base, etc., is meant one situated on a continent or on such a large island that the enemy may land at a distance from the base without opposition, and the defense of the base, fort, city, or other locality becomes the ordinary one of the preparation and occupation of a defensive position. This position must be strong enough, both as to its characteristics and as to the force occupying it to defend the base against not only a raiding force, but also against a deliberate, powerful and long sustained attack.

The conditions surrounding the two situations manifestly differ in some respects and therefore require different solutions.

The defense of a purely insular locality or base has the following

advantages over the ordinary defensive position: Its field of fire is unlimited; there is no terrain to conceal the movements of hostile troops; its target (boats loaded with men) is the most vulnerable of all targets; the landing can be readily interfered with by means of obstacles, mines, etc.; if the boats succeed in reaching the beach the troops are, necessarily, while disembarking and forming on shore in a state of disorganization; after landing they are unfamiliar with the country, and, finally, a defeat is almost certain to result in the complete destruction or capture of the hostile landing force.

The disadvantages of an insular base are that the defending force is exposed to the fire of the powerful guns carried by the supporting fleet; that the fleet by reason of the swiftness of its movements may threaten any number of points and still concentrate without difficulty at the selected landing places; and that the defenders, owing to the small area of the island, must hold all landing places in force, so as to prevent the seizure of commanding positions from which the enemy may by his artillery fire render the base untenable.

*The general scheme for the mobile defense of insular bases involves the following considerations:*

- (a) A main line;
- (b) A second line;
- (c) A stronghold or keep;
- (d) Artillery;
- (e) Sectors of defense;
- (f) General Reserve;
- (g) Roads;
- (h) Wire and visual communications;
- (i) Transport and supplies;
- (j) Camps, sanitation, etc.;
- (k) Working parties, etc.

#### THE MAIN LINE.

In an insular base fire trenches for infantry and machine guns should be constructed at all landing places. They should be near the beach so that the enemy may be met while still in his boats or while in the act of disembarking; the trenches should be located in low positions so that the fire of the ship's guns against them must cease as the boats approach the beach; so that the defenders may be in the best position to meet night attacks; and so that the best fire effect may be obtained; they must be as nearly invisible as it is possible

to make them, and they must afford protection to the defenders against the tremendous fire of the fleet. Invisibility, however, will be their chief protection, and every precaution to keep the defenders out of sight must be taken; the trenches should be connected with cover trenches or with covered or protected positions in rear by means of concealed communicating trenches; these communicating trenches should, if necessary, be roofed over with sod or brush; lines of trenches in rear for tiers of fire should also be constructed. The water approaches to the landing places should be obstructed with submerged obstacles, such as wire entanglements, spikes, abattis, etc., so as to prevent a landing, or at least to hold the boats under our fire for a considerable time; contact or observation mines should also be planted in all approaches to landing places. Obstacles, land mines, live wires, etc., should be utilized on the beaches so as to impede the formation of the troops after landing. Searchlights, bonfires, etc., should be placed so as to illuminate the sea and with the object of making it impossible for boats to approach the beach at night without being observed, and with the object also of interfering with the navigation of hostile boats; finally, the most careful provision should be made for distribution of fire on the entire target, especially at night.

#### SECOND LINE.

A second line should be constructed in rear of the first to be held in case the first line be penetrated. This line, if practicable, should be sufficiently advanced to prevent the hostile batteries from taking positions from which they could attack the fleet or the station. Communicating trenches or protected roads from the first to the second line should be provided so as to permit a safe withdrawal from the first line and occupation of the second line. Similarly the reserves must be able to reach the second line without being exposed to the hostile fire. This line must be held to the uttermost as the safety of the train and therefore the efficiency of the fleet will depend on this defense. Should the defenders be so weak as not to be able to hold a line sufficiently far in advance to afford this protection, advance posts may be fortified and held with a view to delaying the destruction of the base by the enemy.

#### STRONGHOLD OR KEEP.

Not only is it important to protect the base from hostile attack

so as to preserve it for our own use, but, likewise, it may be important and perhaps vital to deny to the enemy the use of the base. For this purpose a stronghold or keep should be constructed and heavily fortified. Heavy guns should be lavishly used in its defense, and the garrison should be well provided with food, water, ammunition, etc.

#### ARTILLERY.

Artillery will be a tremendous factor in the defense of insular bases. By reason of its use of indirect laying, it may be placed in secure positions which the ships' batteries cannot reach and from which every approach to every landing place may be swept by its fire. Owing to the rapidity of movement of the enemy's fleet, there will be but little time to shift the batteries; each landing place and its approaches must therefore be continuously covered not only by infantry fire but by artillery as well. It is of great importance also that the transports should be forced to keep far from shore, thereby exposing the comparatively slow moving boats laden with men to a long continued attack with shell or shrapnel. Heavy artillery is essential for this purpose and even the armored ship may be held at arm's length if heavy howitzers or mortars be utilized by the defenders. The terrain of many islands like that of Culebra is of such nature that a rim of steep hills runs parallel to the beach, making a gun of short range and high angled fire necessary if the beaches are to be swept by any but direct artillery fire. It would be suicidal to use direct fire, during the daylight hours, as the field pieces would be smothered or destroyed by the tremendous volume of fire from the fleet. The mountain battery is admirably fitted for this role of covering the beaches with indirect fire. It is light, easily transported, and can be adapted for high angle fire to such an extent as to bring it into the same class as a mortar. I believe that with ample artillery of all classes placed in defiladed positions so as to cover all beaches and the approaches thereto, this arm alone would be able during daylight attacks to destroy all flotillas conveying landing forces before they could reach the beach. At night, owing to the curtain of darkness which even efficient searchlights will only partially lift, and owing to the difficulties attending accurate indirect laying, infantry and machine guns must become the chief reliance of the defenders. The powerful backing of artillery fire must not be discarded, however, and positions for direct laying close to the beach should be

selected and a part of the guns placed in them after nightfall and withdrawn before daylight. The remaining batteries in retired positions should be assigned so as to cover all sectors, and a most diligent watch kept so that immediately upon the hostile flotilla being picked up by the rays of the searchlights, a tremendous volume of fire may be brought to bear on it.

#### SECTORS OF DEFENSE.

An insular base, by reason of having its entire perimeter placed in a state of defense, corresponds very closely to the closed works of a fortress. Like a fortress, it is probable that it will prove to be too extensive for all troops to be directly supervised by one man. It should therefore be subdivided into several sectors, each sector being independent of the others, but subject, of course, to the orders of the Brigade Commander. The fact that an advance base brigade consists not only of infantry, mobile artillery, and the necessary auxiliary troops, but also of troops which in their military functions approximate closely to the coast artillery, causes the division of the defenses into suitable sectors to be somewhat difficult. If the coast defense batteries happen to be located in close proximity to each other and occupy a distinct portion of the defensive perimeter as was the case at Culebra in the maneuvers of 1914, the division in question might be made by assigning the fixed defense regiment to the sector occupied by its batteries, and by dividing the remainder of the perimeter between the infantry regiments. This, however, I do not believe to be the best disposition even under the special circumstances mentioned above. The special mission of the fixed defense regiment, of the batteries manned by it, and of the mines planted and controlled by it, is to prevent damage from being inflicted by the hostile fleet, on our train while at anchor at the base; and to use every means at its disposal to destroy the enemy's fleet. In brief, all of its efforts should be directed against the enemy's ships. On the other hand the special mission of the mobile forces is to prevent the hostile landing forces from seizing the base itself or from occupying a position from which its artillery may render the base an unsafe refuge for our fleet.

In order to secure the best results I believe it to be mandatory that each organization should concentrate its attention and its activities on its own special mission; and that neither should infringe upon nor interfere with the prerogatives or duties of the other.

Therefore the officers attached to the mobile forces should not exercise command over the batteries or the submarine mining operations, and conversely the officers of the fixed defense regiment should not exercise command over the mobile forces. Accepting this conclusion as correct, the question of the division of the defensive position into sectors and the assignment of tactical units thereto is greatly simplified. The entire perimeter would, under these conditions, be divided so as to give to each infantry regiment its own independent sector for the security of which against attacks by landing forces its commander would be held responsible. The commanding officer of each sector would himself make the assignment of his troops to the first line, and to the local supports and reserves. The proportion of troops to be assigned to the several echelons would depend on the defensive strength of the first line trenches and the security of the means of communication with them from the rear. As a general principle no more troops should be kept in the fire trenches than the needs of the military situation make mandatory, as exposure to the terrific fire of the fleet will be most trying and even demoralizing to the best of troops. At night, however, the first line should be strongly manned.

The sectors will ordinarily be subdivided into parts which one battalion can defend, each battalion furnishing the details for its own fire trenches and its own supports.

The headquarters of the sector should be located at the post of the reserve. It should be on the main road to the front.

#### GENERAL RESERVE.

In addition to the reserves of the various sectors, the defense of an insular base or of a fortress requires that a general reserve be held out of the trenches under the direct control of the brigade commander. This reserve is *his* instrument to be used in accordance with *his* plans, and at the time and place which he may decide to be the most critical. Were all the troops assigned to sectors, there would be none available to throw in at the crucial moment, as the commander of each sector would be convinced that the greatest danger was on his front and would hold on to his own men like grim death. The general reserve, ordinarily, would as a whole be centrally located at the junction of the radial roads to the front, but the conditions may be such as to require it to be divided, and the location of the fractions in rear of the most vulnerable parts of the de-

defensive perimeter. The general reserve should consist entirely of infantry and machine guns. No part of the mobile artillery should be held in reserve.

#### ROADS.

One of the most important features of a fortified base is the means of interior communication. The roads necessary to provide for such communications should be among the very first defensive works undertaken. In general, the following roads should be constructed:

(1) Radial roads from brigade headquarters or main supply depot to the headquarters of each sector.

(2) Roads from the headquarters of each sector to the position of each of its supports.

(3) Roads or communicating trenches from each support to the fire trenches.

(4) A circumferential road in rear of the defensive works.

(5) Cross roads connecting the various radial roads.

(6) If the tactical situation requires the general reserve to be located at any place other than at brigade headquarters, or off the road system, roads connecting its post with the main road system must also be constructed.

In locating and constructing these roads not only must the rapidity of moving reinforcements, etc., be considered, but questions affecting their security and invisibility are of great importance. Troops marching on these roads should be invisible from the sea and not exposed to hostile fire. This should especially be considered in the case of the roads connecting the first line trenches with the second line; and not only should these roads be unexposed to the fire of the hostile fleet, but these roads should be exposed to the fire of our troops when occupying the second line.

#### WIRE AND VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS.

Rapidity and accuracy in transmitting orders to the front and information to the rear are the most marked characteristics of modern warfare. To accomplish this most important and necessary task requires a complete battle system of wire communications supplemented by visual communications for use in case the wires be cut or the system be thrown in disorder by artillery fire, or by other

means. The wire communications may be subdivided into two systems:

- (a) The administrative system,
- (b) The battle system.

This paper will not touch upon the administrative system. By means of the battle system the brigade commander would be connected with each regimental or sector commander, with the commander of the mobile artillery, with the headquarters of aviation detachment, and with the more important observation stations. Each sector commander would also be connected with the artillery commander, with the commanders of the other sectors, with the commander of the fixed defenses, and with each of his own groups or supports. Each group or support would be further connected with the fire trenches in its front. The interior communications of the mobile artillery are provided ordinarily by that arm. The visual signal system should not only be available for use as a substitute for wire communications, but should also supplement it. It may be the only means of communication between headquarters and isolated observation stations or garrisons on an islet or located at great distances from the main body. The field wireless, too, would be of much value under such conditions whenever practicable to transport it, and there would also appear to be a wide field of usefulness for the homing pigeon reared and trained at the base.

#### TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES.

These questions are of the most vital importance. Troops must be fed, they must have water, and they must be supplied with ammunition. None of these problems have been solved by us. We depend on Providence, and hope that God will supply animals, wagons, etc., like manna from the sky at the place to be defended. It is difficult to see any satisfactory solution of this problem. The system of transport on board naval vessels precludes a large number of animals, etc., from accompanying the brigade, not to speak of the necessity of rapid mobilization and embarkation. We can carry with us, however, a certain number of motor trucks, which have now been so developed for military purposes as to be suitable for use over bad roads or even over a rough country without roads. I believe that these motor trucks supplemented by the transportation which can be obtained in the vicinity of the base must be our ultimate solution of the problem. The water supply problem is

likely to offer many obstacles to the defense of naval bases. In this case likewise it is difficult to provide a standard solution of the problem which would fit all cases. Water for the fractions quartered near the anchorage of the train or near any landings protected from attack can readily be provided by the vessels of the train. Heretofore barrels have been used for this purpose; they are, however, very unsatisfactory, wasteful and insanitary. For drinking water, galvanized iron tanks of suitable capacity should, I believe, be furnished. These should be placed at such points as depots, headquarters, reserves, stronghold, second line, and supports. These tanks should be kept filled either from the local supply or the ships. They should be rigidly guarded and every possible measure taken to prevent waste and contamination. In addition concrete cisterns should be built, and a reserve supply stored. All food supplies in the vicinity should be purchased, especially cattle and other live stock, and only a quantity sufficient for the actual needs of the native population should be sold or issued to them. These precautions may be essential, as the fortunes of war may perhaps separate the brigade from the entire fleet including the train, under which circumstances it would be placed solely on its own resources and possibly have to stand a siege.

#### CAMPS, SANITATION, LANDING, ETC.

Landings of necessary troops, stores, etc., should be made near the landing places to be defended if it is practicable to do so. By so doing, infinite labor and much time in preparing for defense may be saved. Similarly the water route for keeping these detachments supplied should be utilized just so long as the enemy allows it to be done, thereby giving our forces time for opening roads and improvising transportation facilities to supplement the auto trucks carried with the expedition. In selecting camp sites, sanitary as well as military considerations should be given great weight. Heretofore, in tropical wars, disease has been much more fatal than bullets. Low places infested with mosquitoes should not be chosen, invisibility from the sea if beyond effective range of the hostile guns is not important. Ordinarily, however, military considerations would be paramount as to the general location of the reserves, while sanitary considerations would be given greater weight in regard to the exact location of their camps. The permanent camp for the forces occupying each sector should, as previously stated, be near the sta-

tion of its reserve; every possible comfort and facility should be provided at these camps, for it is there that the troops will come for rest and recreation when relieved from the arduous duty in the trenches themselves unless the supports can be placed in covered positions when shelter tents may be used.

#### WORKING PARTIES.

It is now axiomatic that the troops which are to garrison any defensive position should prepare it for defense. The commanding officer of each sector then would select and be responsible for the location of the lines, trenches, roads, etc., in his sector, and his troops with the assistance of hired civilians would actually construct the works. This duty is a most arduous one, and the men should not be overtaxed in the heat of the day. The greater part of the work should be done in the early hours of the morning and in the late hours of the afternoon. Plenty of good, wholesome fresh food, pure drinking water, salt water bathing, cleanliness in camp, and protection from mosquitoes will keep the men in good health notwithstanding the most arduous work by day and by night. On the other hand idleness, booze, and lewd women will produce the most rapid deterioration not only in their physical condition, but also in their morale, their esprit and even in their courage. Men who lead a clean life will, I feel certain, give better service to their country when the great test comes, than the drunkard or the debauchee.

#### CONTINENTAL BASES.

The defense of a continental base differs in some respects from the defense of an insular base, as stated in the first part of this paper. The first or main line of defense of a continental base does not possess the advantages of the similar line in the defense of an insular base. The defenders in the case of the continental base, do not possess the unlimited field of fire, the vulnerable target, the advantage of the enemy being disorganized upon landing, or the security of the defender's artillery by being defiladed from hostile artillery fire. The features, other than the main line of the defense of a continental base, however, are practically the same as those of an insular base and as such have already been fully discussed. We are all familiar with the requirements of the defensive position and with everything in regard thereto which is laid down in detail in the many text books which we have read and studied in preparation

for examinations for promotion. I will not therefore, take up your time in discussing these questions but will read an extract from a pamphlet entitled "Defensive Position in Face of Superior Attacking Force." This extract is based on the lessons taught by the present war and is the latest information available in regard to such matters.

DEFENSIVE POSITION IN FACE OF SUPERIOR ATTACKING FORCE.  
SELECTION OF SITE.

We have been taught that "strategy selects, tactics occupies and fortification strengthens the position." "Strategy is the province of higher commanders, tactics and fortifications are the province of subalterns." It is unnecessary to discuss in these pages the various considerations which influence the commander in the selection of a defensive position, viz: security of flanks, extent of frontage for available troops, etc., as these points are familiar to those of us who have read the various text books and manuals of instruction on Tactics and Military Engineering. The following brief notes and sketches will, however, serve to show the lessons which have been learned, and the changes which it has been found necessary to make in the previously accepted standard methods of Military Engineering Construction and points which should prove of value to those who may be placed in charge of various Field Works.

SITING OF TRENCHES.

Trenches should be sited so that they are not under artillery observation, whenever possible, also with regard to *possible observation* stations on ground occupied by the enemy. This point is regarded as of great importance, and not subsidiary to extensive field of fire.

A field of fire of 100 yards is regarded as satisfactory, if it cannot be increased without loss of concealment from the enemy's observation stations. The concealment of obstacles to check the enemy's advance, such as barbed wire entanglements, etc., is of importance, as said obstacles aid the observer in locating and ranging on trenches in rear.

The skilful siting of trenches back of a slight rise, behind a second hedge with obstacles hidden in the same way, or entangled in the hedge in front, has been found to afford the most satisfactory concealment in the earlier stages of an attack.

It has been found along the Western line now held by the British and French that the shell fire is awful and unceasing, the accuracy of ranging phenomenal, and the strain on officers and men enormous. Consequently the target must be reduced to the smallest possible dimensions. This object has been attained by abandoning the types of trenches shown in all previous manuals of Military Engineering and adopting a plan and type which can be best explained by reference to accompanying plan and section. The advance by either side is now considered by yards instead of miles, and is somewhat similar to the methods of attack and defense of fortress. The following brief notes which should be remembered and which must be considered when constructing field defenses are:

- 1st. Protection from shrapnel.
- 2nd. Protection from high explosive shell.
- 3rd. Protection from observation of shell fire by the enemy.

The objects can be best obtained by constructing the trenches *as narrow as possible, as deep as possible* (from 3 feet for fire trenches to 16 feet for cover trenches—which are excavated at a distance of 40 yards in rear of fire trenches, and parallel to them)—to which men may retire during bombardment, the fire trenches being held with as few men as possible). *As much frontal fire as possible*, as it has been found that during an attack by the enemy, which usually occurs at frequent intervals during the night, and is generally universal along the whole line, each section can give but small assistance by flank fire to the section on either side. Eighteen to twenty-four inches is considered sufficient width for trenches. No stretcher carrying can be done, but a trench of similar width parallel to the firing line, and about 15 yards in rear (see sketch) is constructed to permit of communication with the different sections of the firing trench. This cover trench is linked up to the firing trench A at each traverse by a passage 15 B cut to same depth and in similar manner. \*

The fire trench should be of the recessed and traversed type, as described in the Manual of Field Engineering, whenever time permits. The height of parapet should be almost nil. The surplus earth from excavation should be spread or sodded depending on the nature of the ground in which the trench is constructed.

Earth not required for the parapet should be placed behind and close to the trenches to afford protection against the back blast of high explosive shells, provided the trenches are not rendered con-

spicuous thereby. The earth in the parados must also be sodded or treated in a similar manner to the earth in the parapet. The excavated material can be used to construct dummy trenches to draw the enemy's fire.

All elbow rests should be dispensed with or made as narrow as possible. Most men, however, prefer making their own niches for the forearm to rest against. A simple device to ensure the men's rifles being aimed in the right direction and elevation is useful in case of night attacks and in the absence of searchlights or flares.

All recesses under parapets must be shored up. If plankng or similar material is available, considerable time and the annoyance of earth caving in during construction of recesses can be overcome by laying said planking on the ground at front line of excavation with a good bearing at each end, then excavating the recess under said planking and throwing a portion of the earth on top of the planks. This excavated earth will form a parapet and protect the occupants of the recess from shrapnel bullets.

Headcover and overhead cover, as shown in Manual of Field Engineering, is impossible, except at certain points which are to be used as observation stations, and which must be carefully concealed.

Where headcover can be constructed to advantage, a continuous loophole is considered the best form.

The question of cover from fire for the reserve depends upon the distance in rear of firing line or the ability of the enemy's artillery in searching the ground on which reserves may be stationed. In any case, the possibility of being observed by aerial reconnaissance must be considered.

Point d'appui is unpopular, being most subject to attack. Straight trenches are preferred, as flanking fire is not to be relied upon.

In the event of the flank or flanks of a defensive line having to be drawn back, the trenches should be constructed in echelon. Curved trenches are subject to enfilade fire, especially by heavy artillery at long range.

The cover trenches, previously mentioned and marked "D" in attached plan, are usually constructed about 40 yards in rear of fire trench. They should be as narrow and as deep as the surrounding ground will permit. Recessed in these cover trenches, dressing stations and latrines should be provided.

Drainage is one of the considerations which should be borne in mind by officers whose duty it is to select the site and lay out the work. If possible, a trench should be cut to the lowest point in the surrounding ground such as a ditch, sunken road, or convenient hollow. If such does not exist, soak pits should be dug at convenient intervals and water pumped or bailed out.

Machine gun emplacements should be on the flanks of the position and under cover as much as possible. Avoid unmasking too soon so as not to expose to premature destruction by artillery.

Hold a wood in an advanced position or close in front with strong overhead cover to protect the defenders from injury by falling trees.

Obstacles must be provided to break up or check the enemy's attempts to rush the trenches. Barbed wire is undoubtedly the most effective for this purpose, especially if well concealed. The advantage of concealment, in addition to preventing ranging of the trenches in the rear, is also that working parties are enabled to repair nightly the damage or partial demolition of said obstacles. This repair work, which is carried out by the R. E., is considered the most nerve racking of all, as the enemy's trenches are frequently not more than 100 yards or even 50 yards away.

The method of constructing high wire entanglements, as shown in Manual of Field Engineering, with its posts set 3 feet 6 inches or 4 feet above the ground, and the barbed wire strung thereto, has been abandoned, owing to the fact that first, the posts are altogether too conspicuous and make excellent range marks for the enemy; second, as all repair work has to be carried out at night within close range of the enemy's trenches, absolute silence must be maintained, consequently hammering or driving posts are out of the question.

Various substitutes for posts have been tried with more or less success. Three sided triangles constructed with strong limbs of trees, firmly lashed together, have been prepared in rear of trenches and carried out and set in front of the firing line at night, at intervals of about 15 feet. These are fastened to an anchorage placed in the ground and the barbed wire well laced between and all over them.

Also limbs of trees about 8 or 9 feet long, crossed at the center and similar to the spokes of a wheel, have been constructed and erected in the same manner.

Any light, portable and strong support for barbed wire obstacle and of value.

The construction of simple flare lights of long life, shielded on the defender's side, should be practiced.

A few notes obtained from airmen should be of assistance to those engaged in Field Engineering Construction:

A. A long line of trenches is more visible than those arranged in groups.

B. Straight trenches are conspicuous.

C. Trenches across ploughed fields are bad and easily distinguished.

D. Straw spread at bottom of trenches conspicuous.


E. Trenches against hedges are invisible.

F. Very difficult to tell whether trenches are occupied or not. This also applies to gun emplacements.

G. Tracks to gun emplacements are very visible. Tracks should be made to all dummy entrenchments.

H. Cover trenches with brushwood to hide deep shadows at bottom.

#### STANDARD FIELD TRENCH.



The Firing Trench is only 18 inches wide, with no head cover, as owing to the proximity of the enemy's trenches, headcover prevents sufficiently quick resistance to bayonet charges. The Firing Trench is recessed every five rifles, and is located on the reverse slope of a hill, if possible.

The Communicating Trenches contain the latrines.


The Trench for Supports is 16 feet deep by 2 feet wide, or as near as may be, and has recessed dressing stations and kitchens.

In conclusion, I deem it appropriate to dwell on the fact that the entire Marine Corps is primarily an infantry organization. In other words, in discussing the mission of the mobile forces in time

of war, I am discussing what may be the mission of the whole Marine Corps or of any part of it. I mention this because, in my opinion, the infantry of any military organization is not only the backbone of that organization, but possesses in a superlative degree, the very highest military qualities.

Discipline is the foundation of military success, and the only military organization which has possessed discipline in its highest form in the past, and I believe the only one which now so possesses it, is the infantry. Its mode of training has a tendency to produce discipline, while the mode of training of the artillery or of the auxiliary troops does not possess that tendency in anything like the same degree.

Let us not forget that we are, first of all, infantrymen, and have inherited the glorious traditions of that arm of the service. Modern infantry is the direct descendent of the Greek Phalanx with which Alexander swept victoriously over the whole of Asia, of the invincible Roman legions of Julius Caesar, and of the marvelous battalions of Napoleon Bonaparte which even after the terrible retreat from Moscow turned defiantly and held at bay the pursuing Russian masses while the remnants of the Grand Army crossed the Beresina River into comparative safety.



## A CENTURY-OLD TRIBUTE TO THE NECESSITY OF MARINES WITH THE FLEET.

A remarkable tribute to the necessity of a full complement of marines with the fleet is found in a publication issued in London in 1824. The publication in question is entitled *Naval Battles From 1744 to the Peace In 1814, Critically Reviewed and Illustrated*, by Chas. Ekins, Rear Admiral, C. B. K. W. N. His reference therein to the services of the Royal Marines, and his earnest plea that not only should the infantry regiments which in those days served aboard ship be replaced by an equal number of marines, but that there should in addition be no other troops on the coast of Great Britain but the marines, is of such interest that it is reproduced in full.

Some of the arguments advanced by Admiral Ekins in support of his plea are so applicable to conditions obtaining today that the parallel is striking, and especially so when the lapse of a century is considered. The article is also of great interest because it throws a sidelight on the status of the British marines in those days. So far as the *GAZETTE* is informed this article has never been brought to the attention of the Corps. While the employment of infantrymen on board ship no longer holds either in the British service or in ours, the arguments of Admiral Ekins apply with certain force to the employment of marines on all expeditionary service with the fleet in preference to any other troops.

Carrying out this argument to a logical conclusion we find recent support in the Nicaraguan expedition and in the present Haitian occupation, where the fleet and the marine expeditionary brigade were of sufficient strength to cope with those problems without external reinforcement, and with complete success. From this it is but a simple step to imagine the Vera Cruz operations carried out in an entirety by the Navy Department from the moment the fleet and transports weighed anchor for Vera Cruz until the last American fighting man reembarked and the American flag was lowered at Vera Cruz. Had the Marine Corps at that time been of sufficient strength—that of two full brigades—the whole operations could have been handled by Admiral Fletcher without the reenforcement by the troops of Major General Funston's brigade. While there was none of the friction resultant from the combined operations such as is pointed out by Admiral Ekins, yet, from a purely professional point of view it would have proved extremely gratifying to the naval service had it been able to dispense with the aid of the Army in the Vera Cruz campaign. From the viewpoint of the Army it would have been equally desirable. At that time the Army's main problem was the control of the Mexican border. The withdrawal of General Funston's men to cooperate in an overseas expedition diverted an entire brigade from that control. Had hostilities resulted in the actual crossing of that border those trained troops would necessarily have had to be replaced by comparatively untrained men.

**I**N the different rates certain stated proportions of able seamen, ordinary, landsmen, marines and boys compose the complement of a ship of war; Admiral Ekins begins his observations, and in proportion to the number, nature, quality and physical ability of the complement, is a ship to be considered well or ill-manned; and not, as may erroneously be supposed, by numbers only. Recruits may

much sooner be formed into good soldiers than landsmen can be made into seamen, from the difference of their duties and occupations. The same argument is, in a degree, applicable to the soldier and the marine: the first is enlisted to serve by land, the latter both by sea and land; and in proportion to his service afloat, he is valuable as a marine. A marine enters upon the duty and line of life which was the object of his choice. When soldiers embark to serve as marines, it has generally been attended with disinclination, particularly on the part of the officers: to whom such a change is by no means congenial; and many are the proofs of the injury that has arisen to the public service by this practice.

Upon the expedition to Martinique in 1793, under Admiral Gardner, with Generals Bruce and Garth, and a land force of regulars and artillery suited to the service, Lieutenant Colonel Patterson, commanding the artillery, embarked on one of the 44-gun ships, in consequence of not being suffered by the Captain of the ship to hold a Court Martial, absolutely took from him the command of the ship; taking charge of her himself for the remainder of the voyage.

When the *Resistance* and *Ulysses*, commanded by Captains O'Brien and Carthew, embarked at Gibraltar and carried to Canada the regiment of a late illustrious Duke, the military discipline was permitted to continue in force on board of the senior Captain's ship, when the exercise of it was resisted by the junior. This produced a representation and remonstrance on the part of the Duke, which ended in a written order from Captain O'Brien to Captain Carthew, by which he was to regulate his future conduct; and the exercise of military discipline was permitted. Upon referring the correspondence to the Admiralty, the conduct of Captain Carthew was rewarded by advancement to Post rank; while Captain O'Brien remained as a Commander. This judgment, however, seems to have been reversed, as that gallant officer, whose sufferings when a prisoner in Indian were unequalled, was passed over in a promotion of flag officers in 1812.

There was also the case of Lieutenant Fitzgerald, of the 11th regiment, who was tried by a *naval* Court Martial. He "protested" against its power and authority; and in this opinion, it will be seen, he was supported and encouraged by a majority of the army then present. He acknowledged the power of a naval Court Martial "in cases of mutiny", and denied it in others; the question then is, what constitutes an act of mutiny? Among the members of the

Court are the names of Parker, William Young, Nelson, Pakenham and Rowley.

The case was this: A soldier was brought to the gangway of the *Diadem* by Captain Tyler, for having knocked down the master-at-arms, when in execution of his duty in extinguishing the lights. Lieutenant Fitzgerald told him that if he punished him, he would be guilty of an act of injustice. The man was punished, and the Lieutenant placed under arrest: the Court Martial ensued, which sentenced him to be "dismissed, and rendered incapable of ever serving in a military capacity again." Yet such was the height to which the difference of opinion upon this subject had arisen, that the General Commanding at Corsica restored him to his rank; but the King, upon a proper representation of it being made to him, caused him to be immediately struck off from the list of the Army.

Upon some newly proposed regulations in 1795, which threatened the very existence of the naval authority respecting troops embarked on the ships of war, the Admirals and Captains addressed the Lords of the Admiralty, declaring their opinion that the proposed legislation "must, if endeavoured to be carried into action, inevitably cause the total destruction of the navy of this country."

As a result of this protest orders were received by Admiral Sir P. Parker for the disembarkation of troops in several ships, and replacing them by marines. With such examples before us, it would seem to be the greatest imprudence ever again to risk the preservation of the naval service, by perservering in a system so fraught with evil. Yet the question of divided authority when soldiers serve on board ships does not appear to have been set at rest until 1800 when, in a letter from the Horse Guards it is ordered that "general or regimental courts martial are to be suspended until the disembarkation of the troops; and in cases where immediate punishments are necessary, it will be inflicted under the authority of the respective captains."

Where the laws or orders respecting the government of the two services so materially clash, and a want of cordiality is engendered, where it is of the utmost importance to preserve it; reason, policy and sound judgment equally forbid a continuance of a practice so baneful to the best interests of the state.

With the marines the case is different; the best understanding prevails, as the same laws and regulations guide and protect the whole.

If it be necessary to defend the practice of embarking regulars for marines, it can only be done on the score of necessity ; but should the same means be resorted to, a sufficient supply of marines may be obtained with full as much ease as of regular troops, and a marine recruit is surely as effective on board of ship as a recruit for the army. The misfortune seems to be that the marine establishment during peace is kept too low, and forces that are purely military, too high ; when therefore at the breaking out of war, men are wanted for ships, soldiers are the only men at hand to supply the deficiency. This appears to have been the case at the beginning of the War of the French Revolution ; and many serious evils were the consequence of it. In a maritime kingdom it is deserving of consideration, whether forces exclusively military, or those which partake both of a military and of a maritime nature, are best suited to the services of the state. Should it be said that troops are requisite for the colonies, it is answered that marines are just as well qualified for such service, if not better ; as they are more at home on board of ship, and conversant with the sea and a sea-life. The writer heard it declared by an officer from St. Helena, that a battalion of 500 marines would have performed the duties of the island, with all the benefit arising from the 2000 regular troops, who, with a squadron of vessels of war, were employed in time of profound peace to watch the motions of *one man* ! While regulars occupied St. Helena, the royal marines had the advanced guard at Ascension !

At the close of the last war, and the consequent reduction of the marines, they, upon leaving the Corps, received a bounty to enter into the *army* !

As for the marines, there should be no other troops on the coast of Great Britain. How soon might we then start a fleet that would arrange public matters without consulting the continental powers. Although the war broke out early in 1793, troops were serving on board parts of the British fleet so late as 1795 or 1796. Yet, if during peace time, marines were kept up in sufficient numbers, and embarked in their turns in sea-going ships, some able and experienced men might be distributed throughout the fleet, who would be sufficient to initiate the recruits ; and parties so formed would be found more serviceable than newly raised regiments of the line ; who, by sea-sickness would for a considerable time be rendered useless, to say nothing of their general inaptitude to the change of life. When marines are ordered to embark care should be taken that no

improper influence be used to keep those at quarters as a *show* battalion, whose turn it may be to serve afloat; while only the recruits are sent on board ships. As the marines are "limited service men," like the army, and divided into three classes, a proportion might be sent in every party, consisting of experienced marines, ordinary and recruits.


Upon the subject of the marines, if I ruled, that useful body should be so kept up, that in peace no other soldier should be seen in a sea port; and in war the full complement of marines should be ready for a large fleet as soon as troops of the line or militia could relieve them. I look upon this as one of the greatest benefits the government could render to this maritime country; and if regiments were reduced, equal in number to the increase of the marines, the plan would be a cheap one.

Upon the subject of the marines I will state my further opinion, that they ought, for the purposes of efficiency to be made a rifle corps and their uniform be changed. Whenever musquetry is used in naval actions, for the most part it can only be rendered serviceable by being directed to the picking off of the enemy's men in general, and the officers in particular. Platoon firing, and indiscriminate discharges waste more powder than produce benefit. Therefore no shot should be fired that is not directed to some individual; and, to take effect, the rifle should be used. As a proof of this many captains had their musquets fitted with sights similar to those now in use on the great guns, to assimilate them with the rifle. In making sure of the mark the superiority of the rifle cannot be disputed and the fitness of it to naval warfare, from its comparative shortness, is evident when we consider the limited space in which naval recontres are held on the deck of a ship or on a less surface in boats. When the first rush of boarding is past and the men are wedged close together in a small compass here the soldier is disarmed, and is sacrificed to the short broad sword. And in this case the rifle is better adapted as a weapon than the musquet, as the old Hessian rifle was always fitted with the sword, to ship and unship as a bayonet: a most effective weapon to the marine when unshipped at close quarters, and serving the purposes of the musquet and bayonet when shipped, for any use called for on board ship, as the stage is too contracted for a general and formidable charge. Generally speaking the warfare in which the marines are engaged, when occasionally landed in naval assaults, is of a nature more adapted to the practice

of light troops and the rifle, than to the steady movements of the battalion.

The absurdity of scarlet as their uniform will strike every officer's attention. It is easily soiled; but this is nothing, to the decided character it gives, when seen, in a vessel attempting to disguise itself, or to a boat intended for a surprise. I made a constant practice of following what I considered a good example; that is, to give the marines a borrowed blue jacket each whenever they were sent on boat expeditions, without being intended to land. This would be obviated by clothing them in green, which would assimilate them more with the blue sea, and when sent on shore on a coup-de-main, assist also in concealing them, which the scarlet cannot.

I am convinced it would be better in every way to exchange their weapons and clothing. The rifle would bring down its men in action at a distance and be more conveniently handled when near. The sword would answer the purpose of the bayonet when shipped, since the sword is much longer than the bayonet, as the rifle is much shorter than the musquet; and would be a more effective weapon when unshipped in the hand; inasmuch as it is exactly that kind of instrument best adapted for offence and defence in the crowded act of boarding. Respecting the *uniform* there can be but one opinion as to utility; and now is the time, during peace, to form a rifle corps; when it is generally agreed that this corps should be kept in an efficient state to meet the exigency of a coming war.



## CAPTAIN K. K. V. CASEY ON RIFLE PRACTICE.

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The MARINE CORPS GAZETTE is fortunate in being able to present Captain Casey's authoritative article on Rifle Practice. He approaches the subject not from the restricted viewpoint of a long range match shot, but from a deep study of its application to actual combat. His views carry greater weight than those of any other American expert on this always important subject. For the past fifteen years Captain Casey, who is Adjutant of the Second Infantry, N. G. Pa., has been recognized as the premier long distance expert with the military rifle. His skill is as well known abroad as it is on the American ranges. As a member of several international teams and the coach of the Olympic Team of 1908; as a three-times winner of the Wimbledon Cup and other long range matches; as a member of the New York State rifle team which won the National Match for two consecutive years; and as an expert authority on every phase of military rifle shooting and the control of fire, Captain Casey has undoubtedly accomplished more for the dissemination of rifle practice than any other American rifleman. The Marine Corps is heavily indebted to him for his invaluable aid and counsel through several seasons, notably in those when expert knowledge of rifle shooting was beginning in the Corps. Added to his practical knowledge and his services as an independent investigator into the scientific phases of military rifle shooting, Captain Casey brings facility as a writer and freedom from conventional prejudices. His article is the result of a compilation of addresses and writings on the subjects therein discussed. In full justice to Captain Casey it should be added that these observations were made prior to the European War, but a reading of them will show that so far as the present stage of the war its lessons bear out his conclusions.

THE object of any course in rifle shooting is the preparation of men for the firing they will do in war. If it fails to accomplish this object it is not worth considering. There is no doubt whatever that it is absolutely out of the question ever to expect to have any instruction firing that will approach battle firing. The best we can expect as a result of rifle practice is to have each man carry out his part in collective firing. This sounds simple, but experience teaches otherwise. The impression one gets from certain works on rifle practice is that if men are merely taught to point the gun and pull the trigger they are of as much value in the firing line during the engagement as the most skilful shots.

Continental armies do not believe in shooting beyond 500 meters as individuals, and most of their instruction is given at 400 meters or less than that distance. Their reasons are that they do not believe that the individual soldier should receive instruction in firing at distances beyond his control, the limit of control being measured by what we consider aiming, sighting, and pulling the trigger. These statements have a number of advocates for several reasons, the most important of which is that a lazy company or battalion commander

will reason that if this is true, or if he can get his superiors to believe it true, that it will relieve him of the necessity of carrying on extensive instruction in rifle practice. It is true that individuals, with the exception of sharpshooters (by sharpshooters I mean men capable of independent fire) do not shoot beyond 500 or 600 yards except as part of a group, this shooting being known as collective fire. But this does not prove that men should not be instructed in shooting as individuals at the longer distances.

#### THE REAL MEANING OF COLLECTIVE FIRE.

The term "collective fire" is much used as a fetish to cover uncertain ideas on rifle shooting, its true meaning being "a collection of individual shots fired," these shots forming the so-called sheaf or group. Therefore, it consists of a number of shots fired by a number of individuals. The individual controls the individual hit. It is for this reason that we instruct the soldier as an individual, otherwise we would have our instruction consist of group shooting only. It can be readily seen that instruction should at least take a man up to the point where he can do his part in the group, and this certainly consists of more than aiming and pulling the trigger. Theorists believe that the larger the group the more effective the fire, in view of the fact that with error in estimation of distance the large group will give a few hits, whereas a small group badly directed will give no hits. This in itself is reasonable until we get closer to facts. Good troops will advance in the face of scattered fire and run the chance of being hit, whereas they are much averse to being fired on by men making small groups (even though there may not be any hits in the beginning), because they know that it is a question of fire direction, and that when the direction is right the results will be very impressive. The dropping of a man here and there does not shake the morale of a body of troops half so much as a close sheaf just in front or in rear of them which they know may be directed on them at any moment.

#### A BRITISH INSTANCE.

In the engagement at Nicholson's Nek, October 12, 1900, the Boers were advancing on the British by crawling, at the same time keeping up an incessant fire. The British infantry, insufficiently trained at that time in handling their weapons individually because of lack of instruction, were able to inflict no perceptible losses on

the enemy. The sheaf was too large, and, consequently, ineffective. As a result, when the Boers had crept to within about 300 yards of the British, they saw white handkerchiefs waving over the lines, as a signal of surrender. The depression among the British troops, caused by their ineffective fire, was such that as the Boers approached most of the men threw away their weapons and showed every sign of demoralization.

There is no doubt that the cone of fire of poor marksmen beats sufficient ground to overcome a considerable error in estimation of distance, but a widely scattered fire of this sort would be rather impotent even with the correct range. In other words, no matter how skilful the fire director might be, at no time would he have a good tool to work with. If a man desires to sprinkle the ground he will use a spray with which he has no difficulty in covering the necessary space. But if he desires to wash away part of the ground, he will use a concentrated stream in order to get the full effect of the water. This is what a commander of a company of infantry would do in action. If he desires a concentrated stream he can only get that from well-trained marksmen.

#### THE SMALL SHEAF OF FIRE.

Perhaps few men realize that instruction in collective firing can be held indoors with landscape targets. In England they have a set of landscape targets which were made for use at 30 yards. Their method of using these is to have a director of a small firing unit indicate to his men a certain feature on the landscape target that would offer a good position for the enemy. They then are instructed to fire one shot apiece in order to see how many have understood the objective. They also have groups of men firing on these targets at some indicated objective in order to show the apparent fire effect. The amount of real good work that can be done on these targets is almost unlimited. Clutterbuck, in "Musketry Lectures", divides this indoor instruction into the following: Concentration of fire; distribution of fire; covering fire; superiority of fire; mutual support, and combined sights. There is practically the meat of combat fire.

In advancing to the attack it is necessary to hold the fire of the attacking troops until it is absolutely impossible to advance further without the steady influence of return fire. Every effort is made to reach at least 800 yards. As at 800 yards inaccuracies in estima-

tion of distance are very slight, where is the advantage in a large group, where a close or concentrated one will have more power? If the men have been instructed only in short range work such as aiming, sighting, and pulling the trigger, I do not see how they can be expected to deliver a very accurate fire from the longer ranges, and yet before they can advance to a point where they can deliver this short range fire in which they have been instructed, it is necessary for them to gain and maintain fire supremacy.

There is no reason why the value of good close shooting by a body of skilled shots should be lost as a result of improper direction, nor do the exponents of the large sheaf inform us as to the results to be accomplished with a small sheaf properly directed. They take the stand that good fire direction is an ideal condition, but never accomplished. With good shots it is an easy matter to widen out the sheaf, if such procedure is deemed advisable, and when the commander of the fire unit desires to draw it in he can very readily do so, while with a group of poor shots he can do nothing else but form a large sheaf, and if an opportunity arises where close concentrated fire is considered of value he will be unable to deliver it.

We gather from the above, that whatever instruction in rifle practice we have should prepare the individual to do his part in forming a close group when it is needed—i. e., during an engagement. With limited time and with limited instruction, we can only hope to cover the essentials. The military positions should be thoroughly explained by shooting slowly in the different positions, followed by a slight increase in the rate of fire, in order to teach the use of the magazine without allowing it to become what has been known in the past as rapid fire and skirmish.

#### RAPID AND SKIRMISH FIRE.

I do not believe in rapid fire for rifle practice. Men will fire rapidly enough in action without the necessity of instructing them. If we teach men to deliver accurate slow fire, very little effort is required to increase the rate of fire, and when this increase takes place, the principles learned in slow fire are not lost. If, on the other hand, men are instructed in rapid fire, they put a number of shots in or near the same place in a very short space of time, which they would have very little chance of doing in action. As our chief considerations are the prevention of waste of ammunition, the control of fire, and the holding in hand of the troops, it would seem that in-

struction in a class of fire which may lead to the opposite results should not be a part of our method of instruction. When an action has reached the decisive ranges, firing will be in the nature of surprise fire, or fire at bobbing targets; therefore, some method of instruction should be used to bring about this result.

Regarding so-called skirmish fire, this should have no place in any instruction or record course. It gives the men an erroneous impression of battle conditions, and has the same fault that rapid fire has: that is, it may develop a knack for making scores without any means of application. An advance to an attack is not a skirmish run nor does it resemble it.

#### THE BATTLE SIGHT.

Our rifle is provided with a battle sight. This sight, unfortunately, requires greater nicety of handling than even the peep, and needs special instruction in its use. This condition should not exist. We have a battle sight because it has been found by experience that men will not set their sights after they get to what are known as the decisive or short ranges. I am a believer in the battle sight, provided it can be used instinctively. A hunter or any other man who shoots by instinct will naturally place his front sight on whatever object he desires to hit. When the necessity for a battle sight arises, this is the use that will be made of it.

Our present sight is adjusted for 530 yards. At shorter distances instinctive sighting will result in high shots. It has been found difficult enough to get men to use any sight or even point their weapons during the critical stages of a fire fight, but if they do use their sights and then get no effect the demoralization that will result is evident. From this it is apparent that a battle sight or sight of instinct should enable a man to hit at very close range. There is nothing to be gained by having the battle sight any less than 200 yards. It might be said that if this is the case, the battle sight will be of no value beyond this distance. The drop at 600 yards below the line of sight when the battle sight is one of 200 yards is about three feet. If men would aim at the bottom of the target this might lead to no hits, but this is the very thing they will not do in action. They will plant that front sight on whatever part of the body they see first, which is usually the head or shoulders. Therefore, the dropping shot is more likely to cause a hit than a shot that strikes above the line of sight.

## THE MILITARY VALUE OF LONG RANGE PRACTICE.

We now come to a very important point, that is, whether or not long range practice is of any military value. It does not follow that men instructed in individual fire at 600 yards, and who deliver fairly good scores at this distance, will deliver good long range fire. They do not have the proper appreciation of errors in holding, in wind allowance, and meteorological conditions that men who have had practice at long range acquire. It does not follow because a man is able to keep a group of shots inside of a 20-inch bull at 600 yards that he can keep inside of a 40-inch bull at 1200 yards, while a man who could do this at 1200 yards would have very little difficulty in keeping inside of the 20-inch bull at 600.

Most European armies, as before stated, do not teach the individual beyond short range. To assist commanders of fire units in estimating distances to certain prominent points, experts take ranging shots to locate the exact distance to these objects. In defensive action distances to landmarks or prominent points are measured so that an advancing enemy can be subjected to a very heavy and accurate fire at these points. If men are declared experts by their shooting at distances under 500 yards, how can they locate by ranging shots, distances to certain objects, and how in the name of common sense can men, unskilled in long range work, deliver the heavy and accurate fire referred to? Unfortunately, the very men who should be the ones to combat these theories go to seed in the other direction and lose themselves in individual rifle firing on the target range for the sole purpose of making scores, without trying to apply the principles to battle conditions.

## UNDER BATTLE CONDITIONS.

At the present time, ranges are classified as follows:

- 0 to 600 yards, close, short, or decisive range,
- 600 to 1200 yards, mid or effective range,
- 1200 to 2000 yards, long range,
- 2000 and over, distant range.

Against large bodies of troops, firing at distant ranges can be carried on. Against troops in close formation or troops offering a particularly vulnerable target, long range fire can be carried on to great advantage. The two above apply particularly to men on the defensive, although in covering an attack fire of position may be used by supporting troops, but rarely beyond the lesser of the long

range distances. Because of the fact that troops acting on the defensive have had every opportunity to get the distance to prominent objects and also that troops using fire of position can usually come very close to the proper range, it would seem to me that where long range fire is recommended, unless the fire is accurate, such as delivered by men skilled in long range shooting, it will fail of its object.

There is no doubt that the individual has very little control over individual fire beyond 600 yards: that is, at any distance inside of 600 yards he can reasonably expect to hit the objective selected by him, but beyond this, although he may be able to place his shots very close, he has no assurance that he can hit. In order to eliminate as many of the errors that enter into long range firing as possible, men should be given opportunity, after they have shown sufficient proficiency in short range work, to do some firing at long range. If we can give the instruction called for by these conditions, and the skilful some work at long range, we can at least feel that the men we will take into action will render a fair account of themselves.

#### THE FIRE DIRECTORS.

We have already indicated how absolutely essential it is to estimate the range within certain limits. How many directors have we who could do more than guess the distance to different points? A course in rifle practice, whether for the regular establishment or militia, should certainly cover the instruction of the fire directors. This is done by having them shoot the prescribed course and also practice estimating distances. In addition to these fire directors, field and staff officers should be instructed in the effects of fire, the influence of ground and the employment of fire in action.

#### A CONCISE SUMMARY.

Preparation for battle firing consists of the instruction of the riflemen in shooting, together with the instruction of the commander of the fire unit who directs the shooting.

The riflemen's instruction should consist of:

The care of his weapon and familiarity with the functioning of the parts.

Aiming, sighting, and pulling the trigger.

Progressive instructive firing beginning at the short or decisive ranges.

Record firing at these same ranges with a rating.

Long range firing for those who have shown sufficient skill in short range work.

This should all be made interesting.

The fire directors' instruction should consist of all this, and, in addition,

Estimating distance,

Effects of fire, beside the tactical handling of the unit.

At the present time blue prints can be secured showing a sectional view of the Springfield rifle. I believe we should go further than this, and that colored charts, giving a sectional view of the rifle and also the different important parts, be prepared and placed in every commander's hands for proper display to his command. In addition, printed instructions in large enough type to be plainly read should be hung on the wall explaining the care of the piece, the proper method of cleaning, and also diagrams of sighting, aiming positions, and trigger squeeze.

#### OFF SHOULDER.

There has been a great deal said on the subject of off shoulder shooting to try to prove that it is a valuable military position, and exponents of the same style of shooting will cite examples to attempt to prove that it is used in battle. While no doubt there are times when men will fire off shoulder they do not assume the positions that are permitted in off shoulder shooting in match or qualification firing, and the only occasions when they will use this position are when it is either impossible to see over some obstacle, or when, owing to circumstances, there is not much time to get off a shot and it becomes snap shooting.

#### THE RIFLE TEAM.

The development of a team should be an automatic proposition. A team from an organization should represent in its shooting the quality of that organization as a whole. This idea of specializing on a few stars with the sole idea of winning trophies, while the general shooting of the organization is sadly neglected, is not the purpose of team shooting. Membership on rifle teams should be a reward for general military efficiency as well as proficiency in rifle practice.

One advantage we claim for team shooting is that whatever information is learned at these shoots will be spread throughout the

organizations from which come the different members of the team. This does not prove out in practice, unless the member of the organization happens to be an officer. If the sole purpose were the spreading of information, it might be advisable to have none but officers on rifle teams. If team shooting is held out as a reward for efficiency, it is just as well to permit any man who can deliver the score in *actual* competition in his organization to represent that organization. The style of shooting called for by the conditions in these team shoots indicates the highest development of instructive practice, but it still falls short of demonstration. Without demonstration, while these men would render a better account of themselves than untrained shots, they still need, and this applies to the best of them, a certain amount of experience in collective fire, and this leads to the principle of this paper, that is, demonstration.

#### DEMONSTRATION.

The lessons to be learned from instruction practice are demonstrated by the field firing of individuals, collective firing, and firing problems. This is as far as we can hope to go without human targets to return fire. Field firing of individuals is valuable as it is the application of range instruction to the individual and his part in combat.

Instruction practice is necessary as a stage in the development of the battle shot, but is insufficient because:

1. Targets are plainly visible and easy to sight on.
2. The exact distances are known.
3. The result of each shot is signalled.
4. There is no movement of troops in connection with fire.

Instruction practice gives the soldier confidence in himself with his rifle. It keeps up the interest of old shots.

#### COLLECTIVE FIRE.

Collective fire is fire delivered by a group at a common objective under a common director. This fire consists of two principal parts, the work of the individual and the work of the director. To make this fire effective requires fire discipline, fire control, and fire direction. These are so closely related that failure in one will cause the failure of the others.

Our ideas on fire discipline, control, and direction have been influenced by very lengthy experiments and tests made in European

armies. For years the United States Army worked along with a system of instruction which was suited to the style of soldier in that army, when suddenly it turned around and without any hesitancy pasted on the label "Made in Germany." While no doubt a good deal of this information is extremely valuable, we should not be too literal in applying it in this country. The German theory of the dense firing line has yet to be proved.

The excuse for the extreme thickness of line is to get an effective volume of fire, making allowance for improperly instructed men.

#### THE DENSE FIRING LINE.

As we increase the density of the firing line, we begin to lose in the accuracy of the fire delivered by that line. Therefore, the fire is not as effective as if fewer shots were delivered by a line not quite so dense but delivered more accurately. As we increase the density of the firing line, we increase our losses. There should be a happy medium. A line not quite so dense delivering a more accurate fire would serve the same purpose and decrease the losses. The accurate fire to be delivered by this line must be developed by some other method of instruction than one which would serve for the dense line.

In battle, the target at which a man shoots is represented by the spot at which he aims. He can take but one spot for each shot. He cannot fire all his shots at once and his battle efficiency is the sum of the hits of all his shots fired. So he should concentrate on each shot and try to get that shot away for a hit. When that is done, he can think of the next.

There is one strange feature of collective fire in that, an individual, part of a group, does not shoot so well as he would alone. This is very easy of demonstration. A group of men, each man firing on a separate target, will give a certain figure as the result of the firing on these different targets, whereas that same group of men shooting on one target will not approach in the aggregate the sum of their work as individuals.

The reason is simple. As there is no way in which any one man can be taken to account for his errors with this responsibility gone, the shots are not delivered with as much care as when the responsibility exists. If it were possible to make men feel this sense of responsibility the results in collective fire would be much greater.

#### FIRE CONTROL.

Fire control applies to the leader of the smaller units. He con-

trols the fire of this unit under the orders and direction of the fire director. He orders the sight setting, indicates the target, and controls the rate and volume of fire. He changes the range or the target, suspends and resumes firing as the situation demands. Slow fire should be the normal rate and rapid fire very unusual and only for such occasions as covering fire, when a machine gun has been located, the crisis of a fire fight, repelling a counter attack, and for moral effect on the enemy. Of course, it stands to reason that men will not fire as slowly in battle as they do on the rifle range, but it would be a splendid thing if we could induce men to fire slowly in battle and not attempt rapid fire. A rate of fire too rapid may result in demoralization and absolute loss of control.

In different works published in this country the rate of fire has been greatly influenced by the tendency to form an over dense firing line. Some of our authorities advocate a rapid rate of fire in order to inflict greater losses in a given space of time. I believe experiments at the School of Musketry showed that nothing could be gained by slow fire, and that men actually made more hits by increasing the rate of fire. From what I can learn of the poor firing positions taught at the School of Musketry, I do not doubt that they would have to increase the rate of fire in order to get any hits. It will be found that a great rapidity of fire obtains with a faulty position, the fire consequently being extremely inaccurate, but, of course, if a sufficient number of shots are fired chance enters and hits will be made.

The volume of fire depends on the target presented, the desired effect, the range, and the ammunition supply.

#### FIRE DIRECTION.

Th time for opening fire is partly tactical, but will be found to depend on the individual confidence of the men. With skilled marksmen it is a great deal easier to have them withhold their fire till the proper time, because they appreciate the difficulty of making hits and the necessity for closing in in order to do so. In an attack, as no man need expect to have the ammunition he carries on his person replenished, the skilled shot feels that it is necessary that he withhold his fire until he has gotten to the point where it is possible to push the attack. Because of his knowledge of the difficulty of hitting a moving target, and that every time the target moves forward it means a change in range, it is easier to keep him moving.

The fire director will determine that the proper time for opening fire in an attack has arrived when he has taken the line forward as far as it can be carried without firing. On the defense, where the supply of ammunition is no doubt greater, with skilled shots, the fire director feels that he can start and stop firing at will, as these men would appreciate the difficulty of hitting and would not be inclined to waste ammunition in shooting up their courage.

The proper tactical extension of the men or density of the firing line is influenced by the quality of riflemen composing the line. With poor marksmen, in order to get sufficient fire effect it is necessary to use a much thicker line than with good marksmen, as the effective fire delivered by good marksmen will render unnecessary this density and thus cut down losses.

The fire director's knowledge of conditions must be the deciding factor in the selection and designation of the objects to be fired on and their allotment to different portions of the firing line. He should select objects that he feels will be visible to the men over their rifle sights. Where he may be able to pick up good dividing points with his field glasses, it does not stand to reason that the same objects can be seen by the riflemen. It is also advisable to have him select objects that are easy to explain. This is one of the most difficult situations a fire director has to handle. Some method should be determined of explaining the target so that the men of the company will understand. You can realize of how little effect the fire of a company would be no matter how well it was delivered, unless it was delivered at the proper target.

It is necessary that the explanation of the objective and the allotment of the segments be by word of mouth. The signals of the drill regulations are not sufficient. It is advisable that small megaphones be provided, such as are used by coxswains of racing crews and also by Japanese. It is difficult enough to point out an object standing in back of a man and have him follow the finger pointed at the object,, but how much more difficult is this in the heat of action. You blow a whistle and some subordinate turns around. As fire director you point in the direction of the target and give some cabalistic sign indicating range and rate of fire, and then expect that man to transmit to his fire unit satisfactory information. Experience in maneuvers has shown that it is hard to get men to recognize some indicated point. I might go further and say that on the rifle range it is not unusual, when pointing out a target to the men, to

have them select some entirely different point and begin shooting at it.

The drill regulations state that the captain directs the fire of the company or designated platoons. This does not mean that he will take a position a certain number of yards in rear of the center of his company, and not move from that spot while giving all information for direction of fire by signals. A ground plan of a company in this formation would resemble some of the charts shown for factory management. This is not the intention. The most important duty of the captain is to direct fire and he should go wherever his presence is needed in order to see that there is a proper understanding of his wishes. This applies to the platoon commander as well. They run no more chance of being hit by moving around than by staying in one place. The company is not provided for the protection of the captain.

The choice of ground to be occupied within the limits of the sphere of action of the commander is influenced by the ability to see and fire at the objective, the comfortable positions the men can assume, and last, cover.

While the reenforcement of the firing line is mainly tactical, yet the fire director should have some consideration for the condition in which his men will arrive on the line. If a man's heart is beating violently as a result of loss of breath or exertion, he is not in a fit condition to shoot. Therefore, it is better to reinforce in short rushes rather than long ones. This same principle would apply to the rushes in an attack.

As stated before, a man in an attack can only carry so many rounds on his person, and need look for no more, and yet some means should be taken to replenish ammunition; but it is evident that a rate of fire that renders necessary this replenishment of ammunition is not advisable if the same results can be gotten with a slower rate of fire.

The determination of the moment for advancing to the bayonet assault is mainly tactical, but is influenced by the results achieved in the previous fire fight.

#### ESTIMATION OF DISTANCE.

From what has already been said, it is evident that without the correct range a part of the effect of fire is lost. Also, incorrect estimation of distance affects the value of close shooting. No entirely

satisfactory method of range determination has yet been developed. Perhaps it might be well to explain that the usual systems are what are known as the bracket, the half-way, the use of an object of known size close to the objective, and comparison with a known distance.

These systems can be taught in camp or when other opportunity offers, and it should be a very easy matter to pace off distances to certain permanent objects near a camp site, get the men familiar with the appearance of these distances, and then have them judge the distance to other objects. Guessing should neither be permitted nor allowed to be called judging distance. A man who has stated a certain number of yards to a given point should be asked to explain his reasons for believing it to be that distance.

We should not expect to depend on range finders, because up to the present time no satisfactory form of instrument has been developed for the use of infantry. One of the most satisfactory methods for estimating distance is by taking a mean of the estimates of good shots who are skilled in estimating. It can be readily seen that with an incorrect estimate of distance, even with a clear understanding by all men of the target, very little result will be gotten. Correct estimation of distance usually carries with it the recognition of the target and the ability to explain the location of the same.

Trial shooting is not always reliable, as it is very difficult, except under unusual circumstances, to locate the strike of shots even when volleys have been used. Officers should avail themselves of opportunities on rifle ranges, even when they are not firing, to attempt to locate with their field glasses, especially at the longer ranges, the strike of shots. Of course, some ranges are so constructed that this is difficult, yet there are a number of ranges that will give a great deal of practice.

#### CONCLUSIONS.

It has been brought out that if we intend to develop battle shots, something more is necessary than the mere shooting of the individual. In order to have a more thorough understanding of the principles involved in the tactical handling of the company or battalion, it is necessary to show the application of musketry fire.



## SOMEWHERE IN FRANCE.

### HOW A PATROL OF THE FOREIGN LEGION HANDLED A NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE.

The following detailed account of a night reconnaissance is reproduced from special correspondence in the *New York Sun*. The author, Sergeant Morlac, of the Foreign Legion, is an American.

THE scene is the terrain between the French and German lines at C——, where the distance separating the two lines is from 200 to 800 meters. From our lines a hillside stretches upward to a height of 220 meters. On the very top are the German lines in the shape of a reversed V, the left point of which is a very strong defensive position, built upon a rocky promontory, while the right shank of the V is known as the Flytrap. Between these two lines is a plateau about 500 meters wide, covered by a little wood not over 250 meters in extent each way.

The hillside is rough, cut up in all directions by abandoned German trenches, studded with excavations lined with rows and clumps of brush and groups of trees. The terrain is called upon the maps of the Etat-Major Secteur No. 3.

We have just now been relieved by Battalion D from the petit posts in front of our main line, have arrived at the reserve trenches, 700 meters back of the front line and are expecting a whole night's rest. It is 8 P. M., muster is over and the candles are getting fewer and fewer. Zinn is already snoring.

I arrange my mutton skin, get my blanket off the rack and am in the act of loosening my shoestrings a little when some one sticks his head into the trench and yells, "Sergeant Morlac, the Captain wants you."

Out I fly and at the heels of the orderly, descend the hill and enter the Captain's dugout. I salute.

The Captain, without saying a word, hands me a paper to read.

I glance at the heading and feel a little weak at the stomach. No rest for me tonight. It is an order for a patrol and signed by the Colonel at that.

Yet as I read the order all the way through I feel a little tickled. I am given a "Patrouille de Combat," which would ordinarily be commanded by a Lieutenant. I am ordered to take eighteen men, two corporals and one sergeant and reconnoitre the famous "Ouvrage Blanc," situated on the top of the hill between the "Fortin" and the Flytrap.

Returning to the trench I break the news to my section. The only response I get is groans and curses. Much against their will I arouse the men I want out of the blankets, muster them at the foot of the hill and give them their instructions and the password.

The night is rather dark; the moon, at the half, is constantly hidden by flying clouds. A sharp breeze is blowing directly from the German position into our faces. A very favorable night.

The patrol proceeds, arm a la bretelle, past the front trench, through the village and enter the communication trench leading to the "tranchee du nord," our most advanced post, mounted during the night only. Here I again form the men in a circle, and in a low voice convey to them the object of the patrol and again repeat my instructions. I propose to carry the patrol as a whole up to the objective, marching them in Indian file back of myself. I prefer to march ahead so as to choose the line of approach.

On the right of the "tranchee du nord" and running uphill toward the woods is a line of brush about four feet high and very dense. We run, bent low, "arm a la main, bayonet au canon," toward this brush, and, following it, make our way cautiously up the hill. Two hundred meters and the brush peters out on top of a small ridge. We turn to the left and follow a high slope to a line of trees, turn again at right angles and emerge upon a grassy field.

I lie down and the men follow suit. On the other side of the field are the woods about 150 meters distance. In the middle distance is a lone tree with a capote or jacket hanging in its branches. It is there that two men "got theirs" while on patrouille the night before.

I tap my rifle butt with a cartridge and whole line begins to move toward the woods, every one worming his way slowly and noiselessly forward. All at once the man on my right pokes me with the bayonet and points forward. I roll over to him and look. I am somewhat surprised at what I see. Immediately in front at two or three meters is a bare spot of ground covered by about ten or twelve men lying down.

Two taps on the gunstock and every one lies still. With the man on my right I crawl up slowly, automatic in hand, and taking my man's rifle I swiftly and forcibly thrust the bayonet into the body of the nearest. Not a move. It is the leavings of some former patrol. German and French dead.

We are now only fifty meters from the woods and 250 from the

"fortin," which is to our left and up hill. Our objective, the "Ouvrage Blanc," cannot be seen from here. A point of the woods is between us and it. We can hear movements in the woods and once a rifle is opened and closed.

I do not like the neighborhood; so softly give the signal—one tap, two taps, on riflestocks—to retire. Very slowly we make our way back to the line of trees, moving backward, face to the enemy always, and with a great sigh of relief place the trees between us and the Germans.

We rest a while and then I try a new way to get up to our objective. We descend the hill about forty meters, enter an old German trench running to left and come out upon a sunken wagon road running between high banks, straight up the hill between the Fortin and the "Ouvrage Blanc." I place one man on the high bank on the right and one on the left side of the road and tell them to crawl up to a lone tree silhouetted against the sky. If they meet anything they are to return with the information.

After ten minutes I proceed with the patrol and find the scouts at the tree. We are now in line with the Fortin and the "Ouvrage Blanc." The Germans are having a good time in the fort, singing and shouting.

Here I leave the sergeant with six men facing the Fortin and place a corporal with four men more to the right, facing the "Ouvrage Blanc" and about thirty meters back of it.

In the dark it is hard to tell the nature of the works, but it looms up very impressive. I can see the parapet of a trench that runs into it at right angles. We then crawl slowly to the right, now right up the trench, and very slowly and carefully we put our heads over and look. Nothing to be seen.

We listen intently. Nothing to be heard.

I take my automatic in my teeth and slowly lower myself into the trench. It is not very deep, only about one-half meter, and is evidently just a beginning. I send one man back for the corporal and the ten remaining men, and when they arrive place them in the trench, some facing the woods on our right and others facing the Fortin on our left and slightly in the rear.

I explore the trench down to the "Ouvrage Blanc," which I find is merely a pile of white chalk rock presenting a surface of about eight meters high and twenty meters long, and is probably the beginning of another Fortin. Also I follow the trench to the bar wire of the Fortin until I can see two German sentries.

I return to the men and have begun giving orders to descend, when one man nudges me and points to the woods. There, near the woods, but moving toward us, I see a group of men marching carelessly, talking loudly about some affairs from home. There are about twelve of them.


I place each of my men on the side toward them and whisper to each one to shoot at the sound of my whistle, to keep shooting until I whistle twice, and when I whistle long to beat it down the hill to the rear guard.

The Germans are now only thirty meters off. I place myself, count ten, and then whistle. Eleven rifles roar as one. Several Germans fall, the others stand bewildered.

I let the men empty their magazines. The Germans are all down and not a shot from them. But the sentries at the "Fortin" fire at us. I blow long upon the whistle and run with the men down hill. Pell-mell the rear guard follows and finally we pull up in the hollow road. We stop to breathe and listen. Hell is loose on top.

The night is now as clear as day. From the Fortin, the Flytrap and the trenches closing the V rockets are going up by twos and threes. Several mitrailleuses growl, raining bullets upon the place we just left. We are perfectly safe in the hollow road and I take my time tying up Seeger's arm and also put a rough bandage on Solloy's shoulder. Both were wounded by the sentries at the Fortin. Nothing serious, though.

We are all happy and excited at our success and as we descend to the "Tranchie du Nord" every one talks in English, Italian, French and Serbian.



## THE CORPS ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO.

Captain Frank E. Evans, U. S. M. C., Retired.

THROUGH the instrumentality of an Order Book of the old Washington Headquarters that has successfully withstood the ravages of time, it is possible to present to the Corps of today a faithful mirror in which can be seen the life of the Corps in the early years of the nineteenth century. Beginning with an entry of August 22, 1803, in which Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Burrows, Commandant of the Marine Corps, summoned a court-martial to try men for sundry derelictions, it ends with a recital of the execution of a deserter by a firing squad on January 13, 1815. The scope indicated by these two entries is eloquent of the character of this Order Book in which the routine life of the old Headquarters was duly set down.

The entries of those twelve years were set down in many hand-writings, but all were in the neat, precise chirography of those days, with many a flourish, a prodigality of capitals, odd abbreviations, and with many a quaint turn of the written phrase. There is unconscious humor in the entries that refer to "affrays with the Citizens;" grim tragedy when mutiny is the fabric of the entry. Such time-honored military offenses as liberty-breaking find their place in its pages, and side by side with such entry is that of an act of violence. From the sum total of them one is apt at first to summon up a picture of the enlisted man of those stirring days as a hard-bitten soldier who was ever ready to scale the pickets in pursuit of liquor; whose favorite outdoor sport was "sleeping on his Post, thereby loosing his Musket;" prone to fight with and cheat the peaceable citizenry; with his heart set against his officers. There are other entries that on the surface would indicate that their superiors were unnecessarily cruel, and unable to command the respect of their men. Yet here and there we run across an order prescribing the customary honors for the same officers who fell in battle on land and sea, and when we consult Major Cullom's History of the Marine Corps we find these same officers and men figuring gallantly in the wars against Great Britain, the Corsairs and the Florida Indians. Judged by the standards of these days there were cruel and unusual punishments awarded by their courts, but there are many entries opposite the findings to the effect that the punishment had been remitted at the intercession of an officer.

Orders—A General Court Martial will sit this morning at the Marine Barracks, at 11 O'clock for the trial of Corporal Jett's Johnson & Private Henry Seibel & Charles Stebbins the troops on the following charges—

Private Jett's Johnson	Charge—	drinking & conduct on the 5 <sup>th</sup> Inst.
Private Henry Seibel	Charge—	drinking & conduct on the 5 <sup>th</sup> Inst.
Private Charles Stebbins	Charge—	drinking & conduct on the 5 <sup>th</sup> Inst.

The Court will be formed by  
 Lieut. Alfred George—President—  
 Lieut. Thompson—Lieutenant—  
 Charles Lusk—Lieut. Jones—  
 Judge Advocate—Lieut. John Harrison—  
 In the afternoon at 4 o'clock—  
 26<sup>th</sup> of Marines—  
 Washington, May 6, 1864—  
 Franklin Wharton—  
 1<sup>st</sup> Lieut. Jones—  
 of Marines—

Orders—A Regimental Court Martial will sit this morning at the Marine Barracks, at 11 O'clock for the trial of the following Private of the troops, with charges against to these names respectively—

Private - James Duvall	Charge—	drinking & conduct on the 5 <sup>th</sup> Inst.
Private - John Higgins	Charge—	drinking & conduct on the 5 <sup>th</sup> Inst.
Private - George Jones	Charge—	drinking & conduct on the 5 <sup>th</sup> Inst.
Private - Frederick Mitchell	Charge—	drinking & conduct on the 5 <sup>th</sup> Inst.

## UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS.

Segregating the sentences of unusual character, we find early entries relating to flogging for such offenses as desertion, theft and drunkenness. The lashes were laid on to the tap of the drum. The sentence of James Anderson for desertion from Headquarters on October 25, 1808, is recorded as: "50 Lashes, by the Taps, Hard Labor, Ball and Chain." Flogging, however, was abolished when a Navy Department Order of June 5, 1812, extended to the Marine Corps the repealing of corporal punishment as published by the War Department on May 16, 1812.\* Its inhibition was followed by a preference of the courts for hard labor. Another entry in which lashes were prescribed followed the theft by John Bryan of "a tumbler from the Sergt. Major." Opposite that entry is: "Ordered, that William Blackwood receive fifty lashes for being Drunk and losing his Money."

James Morgan was drummed out of the Corps at the same time for "threatening the Lives of the Guard" and John Black, deserter, was sentenced "to have one side of his head shaved & drummed out." Whether this ambiguous sentence was carried out literally only so far as it called for the shaving and drumming out of one side of the head, or whether it was administered as meant, is buried in the history of 1805.

\*

## "NAVY DEPARTMENT.

5 June 1812.

ORDERS:—

Sir:

By the Act entitled "An Act making further provision for the Army of the United States" passed 16th May 1812 it is declared that so much of the "Act for establishing rules and Articles for the Government of the Armies of the United States, as authorized the infliction of Corporal punishment, by stripes or lashes be repealed." This provision no doubt extends to the Corps of Marines, in all cases of trial by Court Martial under the rules and Articles for this Government. In such cases, therefore, punishment, by stripes or lashes is to be considered as prohibited.

I am Sir,

Respectfully Your Obedt.,

(Sgd) PAUL HAMILTON

Franklin Wharton, Esq.,

Lt. Col. Com., Marine Corps."

Prior to the discovery of the order above quoted it was generally accepted that corporal punishment in the naval service was not abolished until the Act of September 28, 1850. This Act, prohibiting the use of the "cat", was embodied in the Articles for the Government of the Navy by the Act of July 17, 1862. In 1822, however, a regulation restricted the power of commanding officers in the use of the "cat." Lashes were awarded in the Navy by sentences of Courts-martial until the Act of 1850. From the foregoing

it would appear that the inhibition of flogging in the Army as far back as 1812 was extended to the Marine Corps, but retained in the rest of the naval service insofar as the entries in the Order Book between the dates of June 5, 1812 and January 13, 1815, show.

One court, wearying of a wave of inebriety that had caught the Headquarters garrison in its undertow, sentenced Charles Daily and John Dunkinson "to wear the Drunkard's Dress, the former for one week, the latter for a fortnight." Their specific offense, committed on New Year's Day of 1805, was in being drunk and absent from quarters at tattoo.

A new form of punishment designed to hold up the culprit to the ridicule of the garrison, appears in the entry of Jan. 5, 1808, when a deserter named Foley, it appears, "four times ran the Gantlope & drummed out." This doubtless was a corruption of the word "gauntlet", as in those days the impress of certain Indian forms of punishment was still fresh, and one pastime of the redskins had been to start a captive through a double line, or gauntlet, belaboring him to death with war clubs and tomahawks on the way. It conjures up a lively picture of the hapless Foley, making his way out of the service through a double line of marines in their single breasted Coatees, white cloth pantaloons and black cloth gaiters, and the red plumes on their high-crowned hats dipping as they stooped to belabor Foley.

Confinement was rarely ordered, but occasionally a month's restriction was awarded for "passing over the fence" or "scaling the Pickets."

The attachment of a ball and chain, or chain and clogs, while in confinement, was forbidden except in the cases of men whose sentences terminated in dismissal from the Corps when Colonel Franklin Wharton, as Commandant, issued the following order:

"The Commandant, unwilling that the character of a Soldier who is to return to his duty after punishment, should have been tarnished by the wearing of Chains or Fetters during Servitude, Orders that part of the Sentence to be remitted which was to place on them the ignominious marks, unworthy of those engaged in the honorable pursuit of Fame: Chains and Clogs."

This order was occasioned by the sentencing of John Fowler and Anthony Mauntpelier in February, 1806, for the attempted stabbing of a citizen, to "hard labor in Chain and Clogs for 2 months."

When Robert Patterson, to whom more detailed space is given

later on, was drummed out of the Corps for treason, he went out with a rope about his neck.

#### MUTINY AND VIOLENCE.

Of the half-score instances of mutiny recorded in the twelve years only one was regarded as sufficiently grave to warrant the death penalty, and in that case the President pardoned the mutineer. The majority of the mutineers confined their mutinous conduct to rhetorical displays, while one, a sergeant, treated one of the diminutive midshipmen of those days with scant disrespect rather than in open mutiny.

Michael Duggett gave vent to his feelings in a scathing denunciation of his officers when confined after drunken and riotous conduct in November, 1808. To quote his court-martial sentence his offence was:

"Drunk and Riotous, and after being confined using Seditious Language in Damning the Marine Corps, and all the Officers belonging to it & saying that he hoped to have the pleasure of seeing their Souls roasting in Hell, & expressing a wish that the Embargo was off, and that he would be damn'd if the Marine Corps held him long."

For these sulphurous sentiments the condemned officers who were the objects of Michael Duggett's wrath retaliated by sentencing him to fifty lashes and one month's hard labor.

The strong sentiment held against the British before the outbreak of the War of 1812 is mirrored by the specifications of two other cases of mutiny that were recorded in 1810. When Private Bartholomew was arraigned on the charge of mutiny it appeared that he had designated Lieut. Robert D. Wainwright, then in command of the marines at Charleston, S. C., as "worse than a British officer," and of endeavoring to impress the command "with a belief that his Comdg. Officer was born an Englishman, thereby undermining his Character & destroying the Confidence of the men under him."

Private Dennis Mahoney went further in his zeal to undermine the character of Lieut. Wainwright. His Celtic distrust of British leanings, which the former court failed to establish, impelled him to "thrust a Bayonet through the Body of the Said Lieut. Robert D. Wainwright," "the point of the Bayonet entering the back a little above the Right Hip & coming out above the Pit of the Stomach."

With John Law, esq., as Judge Advocate, and a court of thirteen officers—an evil omen for the accused—the sentence of death

was adjudged but Mahoney's life was spared by the President.

When Sergeant Mattix of the Baltimore recruiting party not only circulated the report that Lieutenant Laurence Cruise was "continually in a state of intoxication" but was, in addition, "a Dam'd arbitrary British rascal," a court-martial found both charges so ill-founded that Mattix was reduced to the ranks and drummed out of the service.

Oliver Burns was one recruit who found life in the Corps in 1805 not to his liking. In fact he found it so distasteful that while on a practice march from Washington to Baltimore he swore that "he would not serve in the Corps, preferring Death to its duties and by the most obscene language spoke of officers of the Corps." Burns was tried and sentenced to one hundred lashes and dismissed the service.

Another recruit, John Dunham, whose ideas of discipline while away from the garrison were strikingly original, was sentenced to three months' hard labor on January 31, 1809, on the charge of mutinous conduct for "Refusing to return to Barracks with the Corporal, & saying he did not consider himself, under control of any Commiss: or Non-Commiss: Officer, when out of the Garrison."

For the offense of striking his superior officer, Lieut. Swift, while that officer was in command of the Navy Yard Guard at New York, and using the following expression: "You Dam'd Rascal, what do you come here for?" a court convened at Headquarters awarded "50 lashes by the Taps, Ball & Chain at hard labor to the expiration of his time," to Michael Blake.

When Sergeant John Coughlin drew his sword on Midshipman McClintock on the frigate *York* on September 11, 1813, this in war-time, he was reduced to the ranks and given four months' hard labor with ball and chain. The following month, when Corporal William Alexander was tried for mutinous conduct "in forcibly pulling Midshipman Richard L. Hunter in the Guard Room at the Magazine & threatening to strike him with a stick while in the discharge of his duty" he fared better. There were doubtless extenuating circumstances for the court contented itself with reducing Alexander to the ranks.

#### PITY YE POOR CITIZENS.

✓ From time immemorial the professional soldier and sailor has considered the police as a traditional enemy, and in the old days

affrays with them and the civilian population of seaport and garrison towns were but a part of the day's routine. Private Josiah Brown of the marines evidently was thoroughly imbued with the idea that the citizens were legitimate prey. He carried out that theory with eminent success when he induced a gullible Alexandrian to sell him hats in June, 1809, and paid for them with whist counters, which he persuaded the hapless merchant were guineas. He came to grief when the Alexandrian discovered the fraud, for, after due consideration, he was sentenced to "50 Lashes by the Taps of the Drum, & to return the Hats, pay back the Change & pay all expenses of Witness attending the Trial."

There is humor too in the escapade of Private Jeremiah Maloney of the *Chesapeake's* marine guard. In the quaint language of the court that tried him for leaving his ship after tattoo he was likewise guilty of "being concern'd with some sailors of the *Chesapeake* in stealing Geese, the Property of one of the Citizens." For this heinous offence Jeremiah Maloney suffered fifty lashes, and was also ordered "to pay one Dollar for the Goose stolen."

There is another item of interest to the ornithologist in the entry laid against the records of William Smith and James Irwin. It is succinctly told in the following charges that brought fifty lashes to each: "for going, under pretence of shooting Birds, to Dram Shops, getting Drunk & disturbing the Citizens on the Sabbath, and quarrelling whereby Smith got shot by Irwin." It would appear that the word "shot" is used in this case in the light of a more modern meaning, for the Order Book records that the fifty lashes were awarded the wounded man.

In the recital of an affray with citizens in which Sergeants Luther C. Eastlinor and George Kinsinger were the leading actors, this and following entries throw an interesting side light on the latter's career of ups and downs in the Corps. The sergeants two were specifically charged with leaving their posts, "drinking and quarrelling with Citizens & breaking out of the Black Hole and deserting." For this offence Kinsinger was reduced to the ranks and received 100 lashes. This sentence was published on September 10, 1803, yet on October 1st we find an entry restoring Kinsinger to his former rank. A few weeks later he received 75 lashes for being drunk and attempting desertion, and again on November 4th he was broken for drunkenness, and a few weeks later, for the third time, restored to his old rank.

## DESERTS ON COMMANDANT'S HORSE.

Two entries stand out that arouse speculation over the comparative gravity of the double offenses charged in each entry. When Private Josiah Brown decided that he, like Oliver Burns, could no longer taste the savour of life as a marine, he carried out his intention to flee its burdens in a highly original manner. He made his escape from Headquarters mounted on Colonel Wharton's horse on July 13, 1810. Either the theft of the steed was soon discovered or the figure thirteen impeded the flight of the mounted marine, for he was caught and tried, and the court awarded four months' hard labor and confined the luckless "horse marine" to the guard room at night.

Whether the court that sentenced David Mead to be drummed out of the Corps was influenced more by the disrespect with which he had spoken of the officers of the Corps, or by the fact that he had abused his wife, is a secret that the Order Book entry of September 2, 1808, does not divulge.

## WITH SPADE AND KNIFE.

The marine of fighting proclivities in those days, when not able to indulge them on the field of battle or behind the bulwarks of the fleet, did not always turn to his enemies, the watch and the citizen, for a target. Scattered through the entries we learn that Walter May was confined in a cell for a fortnight for "wounding Private Doyle, By striking him on the Head, when on Fatigue on the 22nd Inst. with a Spade" this on February 28, 1809. Charles Carroll was guilty of "unsoldierlike Conduct" and dismissed the service on March 13, 1809, for threatening to run Corporal Rouse "thro with his Knife."

Opposite the sentence of William Pritchard to fifty lashes for stabbing Peter White, sentry on the frigate *Boston*, is an entry to the effect that the lashes were remitted at White's intercession.

## "TO BE SHOT TO DEATH."

This laconic entry is the only instance in which the death sentence was duly executed according to the testimony of the old Order Book, and it appears against the charge of "Desertion from Headquarters on the 18 July, 1814."

There is nothing to show why this extreme sentence was ordered, despite the fact that the United States was at war at the time. Desertion was not an uncommon crime in the services in those days, and its punishment, even in war-time, rarely exceeded that of being drummed out or sentenced, as in one case of desertion at Sackett's Harbor on February 1, 1814, to "two years, Hard Labor, with Ball & Chain." The proceedings of the court in question throw no light on the particular heinousness of the desertion of Joseph Wallis, but the closing entry in the Order Book is of more than passing interest because the details of the execution are set forth.

The confirmation of the death penalty was announced by Colonel Wharton in orders dated December 14, 1814, and Lieutenant Benjamin Richardson, commanding the Marine Barracks, was ordered to carry out the sentence between the hours of 9 and 12 on the morning following. The orders specified that the spot of execution was to be at or near the burial ground on the Hospital Square, and before the whole detachments from the barracks, navy yard and magazine. From the force so assembled in the morning the execution party was to be selected, comprising one sergeant and twelve privates, with the acting adjutant to take command.

A respite was granted that day, but on Friday, January 13, 1815, the sentence was executed. In the words of the order it was carried out according to the following programme:

"At the hour of eleven the procession will move. The Execution Party preceded by the Band of Music, will march in front of the prisoner, at ordinary time, the Music playing the Dead March in Saul, and the Guard will march in rear of him followed by the whole detachment to the place of execution aforesaid. The Music ceasing, the Prisoner Joseph Wallis will then be pleased to undergo the sentence of the Court, which is to be by shooting him to death, from a signal to be given by the Actg. Adjt. The above performed, the Troops will return to Barracks & be dismissed."

There is a curious entry relating to desertion in which William Hobbs was charged with "the Suspicion of an Intention to Desert." The officers who delved into the psychology of William Hobbs' mind found the suspicion of an intention so well verified that Hobbs left the Corps, not on the Commandant's horse, but to the ignominious beat of the drums.

One of Colonel Wharton's first orders was that of the reward of

ten dollars "to prevent desertion & reward the meritorious soldier for information of the intent to desert or the apprehension of the deserter."

#### THE RUM PROBLEM.

That ancient foe of military discipline, the Demon Rum, is the theme of many entries in the Order Book. Their study is well worth while, for they not only reflect the customs of the early seventeenth century, but the bulk of them also show a surprising tendency at that time to place liquor under a heavy ban of disapproval. The historians of that period give weighty emphasis to the prevalence of drink in all circles of society. Grog was a recognized part of the service ration. The gentlemen of those days waged memorable battles over their toddies and port, and the total abstainer was a lonely figure.

The stand taken against the prevalence of drinking in the service by Colonel Wharton, soon after his elevation to the commandancy, is all the more memorable because of the wide toleration with which it was regarded. His first broadside was delivered on April 28, 1805, in the following order:

"The introduction of Rum to the Troops within the Barracks, directly or indirectly, being productive of serious Consequences, by bringing on them Public Disgrace. It is ordered that any Soldier in future who may be found on the Fence of the S. E. corner of this Garrison, or holding conversation with, or receiving from the Citizens, supplies of any kind except in the presence of a N. C. O—will be immediately punished."

He tackled the problem fearlessly a second time, after the rum ration had been increased by official orders, in this order:

"As the late Increase of Rum to the Rations, has greatly tended to the Increase of Intoxication, among the Troops of the Garrison, it is Ordered, That in future one half of the Rum allowance per day be issued in the Morning, the other half reserved for Dinner, which is to be placed under the charge of the Sergeant having for the day charge of the Mess Rooms, this to be mixed in three waters & to be issued in an equal proportion to each and every man belonging to the general Mess—to which it has only reference."

Later, in 1806, appears an entry showing the stoppage of the rum ration by Colonel Wharton as punishment for two men caught scaling the pickets.

It was the custom then to send out liberty squads under a non-commissioned officer who was held responsible for their return. That this responsibility was enforced is evident in two entries made where corporals were reduced to the ranks "for returning to Barracks without his Party, & being beastly Drunk."

The last entry bearing on Colonel Wharton's determined efforts to reduce the drinking habit is an order "to Prevent the introduction of Rum, and if possible to stop the too great use of it already with the men, —that no Stranger, Man, Woman or Child, be permitted to pass a Sentinel without the knowledge of the Sergt. Command the Guard.

#### AN OLD TIME PAY DAY.

Still there were adventurous and bibulously inclined individuals who were deaf to the rhetoric of the orders, and many were the devices resorted to in their sincere efforts to keep up the old customs. One entry is of significance in that it followed the payment of the Headquarters garrison in November, 1805. Thomas Gorman, for being drunk on parade and breaking his musket, led off the list of offenders with fifty lashes and the stoppage of \$3 for the repairs of the broken musket. Five others were tried with him for "being Drunk in Dram Shops" or on post. On the following day three were tried for being absent without leave, and on the third five more. The culprits were lashed at evening parade to the taps of the drums.

David Cohen, impatient of restriction, scaled the pickets and offered his clothing for liquor, thereby incurring two months of hard labor. John Stephens hit on the device of smuggling rum into the garrison in a bladder, and when detected, spent the next fortnight in similar disgrace. Fifty lashes was the penalty awarded Miles Mason, who, as a guard, suffered a prisoner condemned to 100 lashes for desertion, to become so intoxicated that the execution of the prisoner's sentence had to be postponed.

For "selling Whiskey to his men when on Command & playing Cards with them, on the passage from Alexandria to Norfolk in the month of January last" Sergeant Samuel Whitmore was duly tried and reduced to the ranks.

## OFFICERS COURT-MARTIALED.

In this space of twelve years appear but five court-martials of the commissioned personnel. The first case was that of Lieutenant John Howard, who, on October 27, 1805, received from Colonel Wharton the following letter:

"Lieut. John Howard.

Sir. The following charges exhibited against you by Capt. John Hall as cause of arrest—you are hereby arrested on the same & will deliver your sword to the Adjutant, viewing yourself as confined to the City of Washington—which you will not depart from unless by Special Order.

Charged—Specification, For being drunk on the evening of the 26<sup>th</sup> of October, 1805, while Officer of the Day, having charge of the Barracks & Navy Yard Grounds.

F. Wharton,

L. C. C.

M. C."

Below the entry on the Order Book is an extract from the Navy Regulations, in which the Commandant of the Marine Corps was authorized to convene courts for the trial of officers and privates except in cases extending to loss of life or where the dismissal of an officer rested with the President.

The court, of which Captain Daniel Carmick was President, met, by the Secretary of the Navy's orders, at Mr. P. D. Stell's Tavern. The accused challenged Lieut. Michael Reynolds as a member of the court, objecting that Reynolds bore him prejudice because he had once borne him (Howard) a challenge from Captain Hall. This objection was declared insufficient and Howard plead not guilty to the charge. He was suspended from rank, pay and emoluments for a year.

A regimental court tried Lieutenant Francis D. Cummings on March 14, 1811 on charges preferred by Private Frederick Lawder "in violently striking or pushing him" while on parade. Cummings flatly refused to make a plea to either charge or specification, and the court declared itself incompetent to try the case. Cummings was released from arrest by order of the Commandant.

Lawder, undeterred by his lack of success, preferred charges against Lieutenant Thomas Pinckney a few days later "for striking the said Lawder with his sword when under arms and marching

thro' the Streets of Alexandria." The court honorably acquitted Lieut. Pinckney. There may have been hidden significance in the promotion of Lawder to the rank of corporal on April 12 of the same year.

A stormy affair is disclosed in the record of the trial of Lieutenant Jeremiah Anderson who assaulted Lieutenant Alfred Grayson while the latter was under arrest. Grayson had been tried for the alleged offense of using insulting and abusive language to Anderson while the latter was officer of the day on September 20, 1811. The court acquitted Grayson and while the publication of the acquittal was being made before the garrison, and Grayson still under arrest, Anderson assaulted him. The court that sat in his case sentenced him to dismissal and the President approved.

#### A NOTEWORTHY CASE.

It will be remembered that it was on August 24, 1814, when the British forces, after routing General Winder's hastily organized forces at Bladensburg, entered Washington, and, after burning many public buildings, left for their Patuxent base the next day. One bright spot in the Bladensburg rout was the gallant stand made by the marines, these same hard-bitten sea soldiers portrayed in the entries of the Order Book. Every historian who has devoted his talents to this period of the War of 1812 has added to the lustre of the marines at Bladensburg, but it remained for one Corporal Thomas Patterson of the Magazine guard to prove a traitor to the Corps.

The charges brought against Patterson by Captain Thomas Tinney, Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, recite that Patterson did "wantonly, unnecessarily and unauthorizedly, on or about the 27th and 28th of August, 1814, on the whole or either of those days did permit & aid in the destruction of a large quantity of the public Powder which it was there his peculiar duty to have guarded and held in safety, thus acting under a most flagrant neglect & breach of duty."

The specification alleged that Patterson opened the Naval Magazine on the Hospital Square and rolled 400 barrels of powder, valued at \$20,000, into the Eastern Branch of the Potomac.

The wantonness of the act was evident because at that time the British column was well on its way back to the ships at anchor in the Patuxent. The court developed the additional facts that Captain

Tingey only heard by accident that the powder was being thus destroyed, and that otherwise the entire contents of the magazine would have been similarly destroyed. When he despatched Sailing Master Barrey to the scene Barrey found fifty barrels on the wharf. Despite Barrey's protests the destruction of the powder went on, and Patterson, undeterred by his presence, sold ten barrels of the fifty to a civilian named Wilson. It was also developed that Wilson, when claim for his ten barrels was made by the naval authorities, refused to give them up unless duly compensated by the government.

Captain Alexander Sevier, President, and Captain Samuel Bacon and Lieutenants Wm. Nicoll, Benj. Richardson and Chas. Lord, with John Law, esq., acting as Judge Advocate, found all the allegations true, and also that at no time while the British occupied Washington had any attempt been made by them to attack the Naval Magazine. The sentence as duly executed was "1 yr. Hard Labor, with Ball & Chain, ½ Pay same time & then Drummed out of the Service with a Rope round his neck."

#### BARRED FROM HIS SHIP.

An early entry in the Order Book is illustrative of the fidelity with which one sentry, John Ferguson, carried out his orders so literally that when Captain Cassin of the Navy attempted to "pass into his ship without the Countersign," he was barred from his ship. Lieutenant P. N. O'Bannon, the hero of Derne, was the junior member of the court which acquitted Ferguson, but an entry made two days later discloses the fact that in the future the countersign should be given only to the sentry in the navy yard who was charged with the protection of the stores.

#### ROUTINE ORDERS.

Scattered through the yellow pages are innumerable orders prescribing promotions of officers and men, others relating to drill and sea duty, the changes made from time to time in the uniform of the Corps, orders in commemoration of officers of the Corps who were killed in action, and details of officers to the various staff departments. The uniform orders are so detailed that they will be incorporated later in a separate article in which it is hoped to show the gradual development of uniform and equipments from the first inception of the Marine Corps until such a period as is within the memory of many of the officers now serving on the active list.

## DEATHS IN ACTION.

"Orders, In testimony of respect to the Memory of the late Captain John Williams, who died at East Florida the 29<sup>th</sup> of Sept., 1812, from wounds received on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September in unequal but gallantly conducted contest against a party of Indians & Negroes. It is ordered, that crepe be worn by the Officers of the Corps on the left arm & Hilt of the Sword for one month. Officers at distant commands will execute this Order, as to time, from the receipt of it.  
H. Q. of the M. Corps  
Washington, Oct. 19<sup>th</sup> 1812.

F. Wharton  
Lt. Col. Com. M. Corps."

The deaths of Lieutenant James Broom, "who gallantly fell in the action with the *Shannon*" on June 1, 1813, and of Lieutenant John Brooks, "who gallantly fell on board the *Lawrence* in an action with the Enemy on Lake Erie," on September 23, 1813, are likewise respected by orders of Commandant Wharton.

## STAFF DETAILS.

The first order in which the detail of an officer to staff duties is published appears as follows:

"Ordered, that Lt. Robert Rankin be considered as Quartermaster, to commence on 1<sup>st</sup> Jany: 1804, in the room of Lt. Michael Reynolds, resigned, and that Lt. Jno. R. Fenwick be considered as Adjutant in the room of Lt. Rankin, and that they both be obeyed and respected as such."

Under date of February 1, 1809, is published this order:

Ordered, that Lieut. Archibald Henderson, be in future considered as Adjutant of the Corps, in the place of the late John Johnson."

The Lieutenant Johnson therein referred to is mentioned in Collum's History of the Marine Corps as one of the marine officers attached to Bainbridge's squadron in the attacks on the harbor and city of Tripoli in 1804. Lieutenant Archibald Henderson was in command of the marines a few years later on the *Constitution* when that frigate forced the British *Java* to strike her colors, and from 1820 to 1859 served as Commandant of the Marine Corps. As Commandant, in 1836 and 1837, he led a regiment in the Indian fighting.

In May, 1809, Lieutenant Henderson resigned the appointment as Adjutant and Lieutenant Samuel Miller was appointed to that post.

A change in the Pay Corps in the same year is naively recorded under date of December 16 as follows :

"Orders, The Indisposition of Lieutenant Robert Greenleaf making a Furlough necessary his Staff Duties untill further Orders, will be conducted by Lieut. John Crabb, who has politely offered to undertake them. He will be then considered from this day as Acting Pay Master of the Corps."

Again, on March 11, 1811, appears the entry :

"Orders—Vacancies having taken place in the Commissioned Staff of the Corps, by the promotion of Lieutenants Greenleaf and Williams to the Rank of Captains, Lieut. John Crabb is hereby appointed Pay Master ; and Lieut. Joseph Woodson Quartermaster to fill them."

Williams, as before noted, met his end in the Florida Indian War. Lieut. Greenleaf participated in the Tripolitan operations in 1804. Lieut. Miller was destined to achieve a gallant record in the War of 1812. He was in command of the marines at the battle of Bladensburg, where he distinguished himself, and in that engagement he was wounded and fell into the hands of the British.

#### AN ISSUE OF COALS.

Opposite the marginal note of Coals appears an order from Colonel Wharton "that in future Coals be issued to the Troops instead of Wood, that the same be furnished weekly by the Quarter Master Sergeant in the following proportions 3 Bushels worth for each Soldier, 30 Bushels p Mo. for each room containing 20 Men—that number to be quartered in each room generally.—the Qr. M—Sergt will attend to the removal of men to the Hospital from the rooms, & make as correctly as possible, the necessary Stoppage of their Coals for the latter place. The Hospital Guard Room & Kitchen will be supplied from the extra Coals due the rooms."

Pasted in the front of the Order Book is an extract from the letter of introduction issued to Lieutenant Greenleaf, Pay Master of the Corps, by the Accountants Office of the Navy Department on February 12, 1807. The extract reads :

"You will Be pleased to Observe that it will be expected that you will render your accounts regularly to the end of every Quarter, stated in the form of an Account Current crediting all Receipts and debiting all Expenditures, refering to Abstracts—and you will also debit advances made by you (and not accounted for) Stating in an Abstract to be refered to, the names of the persons and the amount, so that the account exhibited will shew the Actual State of the Public Money in your hands at the time it is made up to."

As the copy of a printed circular there was also entered, under date of January 16, 1809, the following order of Colonel Wharton:

"Ordered, That Officers on foreign service or Commanding posts from the Head Quarters of the Marine Corps, are in future to direct all their Returns for the Staff, under cover to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy, This Order must be implicitly attended to.  
F. W."

#### THE MAKING OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

The promotion from private to the various non-commissioned grades was accomplished by the simple process of an order to the garrison, of which this is a model:

"Ordered that Jedediah Dodge & John Gardner be promoted to the ranks of Sergeants, that Thomas Williams & Jeremiah Duskett be promoted to the Grade of Corporals, & that they be obeyed & respected as such

10th Sept. 1803. W. W. Burrows,  
Lt. C. C. M. Corps."

This entry invariably followed another in which a court-martial had reduced to the ranks some non-commissioned officer who had proved recreant to his trust.

#### THE SEA-GOING SIDE.

While little prominence is given in the entries of the Order Book that throw light on the sea service of the Corps, the Order Book being primarily intended for the recording of orders issued for the marines serving at the Washington Headquarters and posts as far south as New Orleans and as far north as Boston, circumstances required the incorporation of three orders that emanated from the Secretary of the Navy defining the duties of the marines at sea,

and impressing on the marine officers serving with ship detachments the necessity for landing their detachments for shore drills.

An order originally issued by the Honorable Robert Smith, Secretary of the Navy, under date of August 19, 1801, was officially transmitted by Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Burrows, then Commandant, to Captain Franklin Wharton, and reproduced on October 24, 1808, when the latter officer was Commandant.

"Capt. F. Wharton,  
Sir,

I herewith send you a copy of a Circular Letter, wrote to the Officers of the Navy.

Yr. obd. Servt.  
W. W. Burrows,  
Lt. Colo. Comdt.,  
M. Corps."

From it we extract two paragraphs relating to the marines.

"The Captain & other Officers of the Ship, will consider the Marines as deserving objects of their Regard & Attention, as the Seamen, and they will not wantonly subject the one or the other, to duties which do not regularly appertain to their respective Departments. Seamen are not to be ordered to do the Duty of Sentinels, or to perform any of the other appropriate Duties of the Marine Corps, and the Marines are not to be Ordered to go aloft, or perform any other Acts of mere Seamanship."

"No Gentleman Worthy of the Honor of Commanding a Ship, in the Navy of the United States, will ever be capable of an Act, so abhorrent to the principles of an Officer, as to abuse this great and important Authority. If, however, there should ever occur, an instance of a Gross abuse of this Power, such transgression will be, upon a proper representation thereof, a Subject of Serious enquiry in this Department. Marines before they are attached to a Ship, are under the Command of the Lieut. Colo. Cmdt. of the Marine Corps: but after they are so attached, the Command of the Lieut. Colo. Cmdt. Ceases—and from that Moment, the Marines, Officers as well as Privates, are under the Capt., or Commanding Officer of Such Ship, And the Marines so attached to a Ship, are not to be removed from her, but by the Order of this Department, nor is any Officer of Marines, so attached to a Ship, to obtain Leave of Absence

on Furlough, but by the Order of the Capt. or Commanding Officer of such, Ship, or of this Department."

This circular letter also authorized the transfer of any marine so desiring, to the duties of a seaman, but on July 10, 1809, the Secretary of the Navy revoked that authority.

Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton, on August 19, 1811, promulgated the following order, one that would be as superfluous in these days of the fleet as would an order prescribing that Colonel Fuller's sea-soldier brigade take part in the coaling of the fleet:

"As the detachments from your Corps on ship board are liable to contract habits unfavorable to discipline & destructive of that agility necessary to service on land, you are authorized and required, whenever any of our Vessels arrive at the Navy Yard in Washington, as often as you may deem proper, to order them on shore occasionally to unite with the Corps on Days of Training and Inspection—taking care however at such times to leave competent Guards on board. This Order is to be considered as extending to the New-Orleans Station: and You will issue to Major Carmick, the requisite instructions on the Subject."

#### ORDERS FOR YOUNG OFFICERS.

Under the above caption, published on September 17, 1807, Colonel Wharton addresses himself to the newly caught shave-tails of the Corps.

"That the Young Officers," he begins, "may be made familiar with that part of their Duty connected with the Marchings, wheelings, forming and reducing of Divisions, and Such simple Manoeuvry. As the number of men will admit of, it is ordered that the daily men for parade, be under arms three quarters of an hour every morning before Roll Call, when the Young Officers will repair to be instructed in Such Manoeuvres as the Adjutant may think proper to perform. The Commanding Officer recommends to them to lose no time in perfecting themselves in the Manual Exercises, as it is uncertain how soon they may be ordered on Command."

His predecessor, Lieutenant Colonel Burrows, on December 7, 1803, addressed himself to the perfecting of the Washington garrison in drill in a lengthy order, from which is selected the following:

"The Officer of the Day will in addition to the Exercise of the morning, attend particularly to the wheeling backward and forward


of the men, teaching them to count their steps & halt when they are ordered: so as to have no moving after the Word Halt is given."

NEW YEAR'S DAY IN WASHINGTON.

That the custom of officers in the service in calling at the White House in a body to pay their respects to the Commander-in-Chief obtained early in that century is evidenced in the following order issued by Colonel Wharton in 1804, on the 29th of December:

"The Officers are requested to be at the Colos. on Monday, in full Uniform, precisely at 1 o'clock, to go and pay their respects to the President & afterwards to the Secretary of the Navy."

In conclusion the GAZETTE wishes to acknowledge to Colonel George Richards the appreciation of the officers of the Marine Corps for the fortunate chance that brought into his keeping the Order Book from which these entries have been taken, and for the care that has preserved it in such condition that the labor of searching through it for this fabric of life at the old Headquarters in the Corp's infancy was materially lightened. It is to be hoped that other records now buried in Order Books and private files may be resuscitated so that their material may be presented to the Marine Corps through the medium of the GAZETTE.



## UNIFORMITY IN INFANTRY DRILL.

Captain Walter N. Hill, U. S. M. C.

**I**N order to secure uniformity of instruction and proper coordination between the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, it is suggested that the Infantry Drill Regulations be adopted for the naval service. Inasmuch as the Infantry Drill as laid down in the Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions, U. S. Navy, is a drill used by the Navy on shore, objection to certain formations not suited to ship-board should not be considered. If certain distances and intervals as laid down in the regulations cannot be carried out on board ship, they can be modified while on board ship. The drill to be used on shore, however, where the Navy or Marine Corps is serving as infantry, should be the same as used by the Infantry of the Army.

We often have in the service strong arguments on certain subjects, which have as their principles, uniformity. Uniformity is what we want, especially in questions like this, where bodies of troops from different services may have to serve together, and move together under the same command. The advantage of having all the troops present guided by the same regulations is obvious. The Infantry Drill Regulations differ in only a few points from those we now use. They will, however, prove more satisfactory, more correct in detail, and will clear numerous points which at present we either have to decide for ourselves, or neglecting our regulations, must turn to them for a decision.

The Infantry Drill as laid down in the Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions applies to the Navy. Its provisions are intended only for troops organized according to Navy standards, so that, when used by the Marine Corps, when organized according to Army standards, it has to be altered. Furthermore it is considered that for actual service on shore the Navy will find that its troops should be organized according to Army standards. A careful study of organization will soon bring conviction on this point.

Consider briefly some of the more evident of the faults of our present Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions, and let us realize that, while we might correct these in our own regulations, the simplest and easiest way will be to adopt directly the Infantry Drill Regulations. Consider first, the formation of the company, which

provides for a company of six squads, with six noncommissioned officers. The interval between files in line, is light touch of elbows, and the distance between ranks is 36 inches. The squad leaders are posted in the line of file closers. This interval and distance is not sufficient. Men in heavy marching order need more than "light touch of elbows" between files, and more than 36 inches between ranks. The Army regulations allow a sufficient interval and distance. As a matter of fact, in the Marine Corps and Navy these measurements cannot be lived up to where men are in heavy marching order. If the Landing Force is strictly adhered to, we would have all of our corporals in the line of file closers, or else our squads would have to be led by privates. Under modern conditions the squad leader must be a corporal; his duties are too responsible for a private. If then every fourth man is in the line of file closers, and in addition the section leaders, field musics, and first sergeant are also there, we will have a company in line consisting of practically three ranks, and a column of squads of five files. Both of these contingencies ought to be avoided. As a matter of fact Marine Corps companies do not attempt to follow the instruction in this particular, as its faults are too obvious. But why, then, should we have instructions that are not best to follow?

Another great fault with our Landing Force Instructions is the lack of a column of twos. The formation provided in the Landing Force for the company marching by the flank can hardly be called a column of twos. For route marches on narrow country roads, and on almost all tropical trails, the column of twos becomes the necessary column of route. In the heat of the tropics, the column of single file on each side of the road, makes a very cool and comfortable formation, and at the same time raises very little dust. In the intervals between the files, messengers can pass along the column. During the long marches of the army maneuvers held in Northern Luzon in 1911, we used the column of twos almost entirely. Regiments and even brigades deployed directly from this formation.

The greatest disadvantage of the column of twos is the necessarily increased road space, but we can be safe in assuming, especially for such service as the Marine Corps will be called on to perform, that column of twos will be frequently used. "Right by twos" is surely more direct and easier to accomplish than "Squads right, by the left flank."

Two other minor points in which the Infantry Drill Regulations are superior to our own, are the posts of the file closers in column of squads, and the post of the captain in column of platoons, or sections. The column of squads as given in the Army book is more mobile, and more military in appearance. The captain of the company should be at its head in the column of platoons. From that position he can command it and give his orders properly. From the flank he amounts to nothing more than a file-closer. In the school of the battalion the greatest defect in the Navy Infantry Drill is the improper intervals between companies. "About three paces" does not allow enough room for any company to move squads right about. As a result we have the most awkward movement of closing on the flank company, when in line, in which the company next the base company has to execute "backward march" for a few paces before it can execute squads right about. In the infantry drill the proper interval of five paces gives the correct mobility to the companies.

There are several other details in which the Infantry drill is superior. It is not necessary to enumerate them here; they are well known to most of us. The principle that I want to emphasize here, is that it is not so much on account of the errors and omissions of the Naval Landing Force that we wish to eliminate it, as it is that the adoption of the Army book will make all branches of the service use the same methods. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have served together frequently in the past, and will in the future, and we must have the same instructions. At the same time there is no use gainsaying that we will profit greatly by the change.

The argument may be advanced that, in abolishing the Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions, we not only abolish the Infantry drill contained therein, but the other chapters on various subjects connected with naval operations on shore, as well. It can be shown, however, that these other chapters are either obsolete, or of little value, due to the reason that the subjects are better covered in other publications. This I think is true of all the chapters except, "Notes on First Aid to the Wounded," and notes on "Military Hygiene."

"Camping," "Bivouacs," "Cantonments," "Manual of Tent Pitching," "Patrols and Scouting," "Marches," and "Field Fortifications," are all covered in the Infantry Drill Regulations, U. S. Army. The subjects of Security and Information are far better studied in the Field Service Regulations, U. S. Army, 1914, than in the brief, in-

complete sketches contained in the Landing Force. Furthermore the chapter on "Orders," in the first-mentioned book, is one that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps can ill afford to neglect. "Combat" in every possible phase is absolutely covered in these two Army publications. In addition the Manual of Interior Guard Duty is concise, complete, and entirely modern.

This disposes of all the subjects contained in the Naval Landing Force except "Formations for Street Riots," "Wall Scaling," "Artillery" and "Firing Regulations in Small Arms." The first three of these are obsolete. "Formations for Street Riots" has no value whatever for military purposes. No formation given in it can ever be used for street fighting. The extreme vulnerability of these formations prohibits their use. The street column and company square will never make headway against an enemy. Our recent experience in Leon, Nicaragua, and in Vera Cruz, Mexico, have confirmed these ideas. Neither will any of these methods prove effective against mobs. Street fighting and riot duty constitute simply a phase of the military profession, which, like all others, require a common-sense handling of troops in their usual tactical units and formations.


"Wall Scaling" is a good physical drill, or, when well done by specially trained men, makes an interesting exhibit for a military tournament. In training troops for war it has no value. The regulations governing "Artillery" in the Naval Landing Force are obsolete and do not apply to the latest three-inch landing gun, neither do they in any way meet the requirements of modern field artillery. The "Firing Regulations for Small Arms" gives the regulations governing the practice, which ordinarily can be contained in a simple pamphlet. The note on "Small Arms Firing" can be found in the Marine Corps Score Book, the Firing Regulations for Small Arms, U. S. Navy, 1915, or the Small Arms Firing Manual, U. S. Army, 1913. It is perhaps necessary that the Navy use a method of procedure in their qualification tests different from the Army. The Navy cannot afford to spend as much time on the rifle range as the Army. But the method of instruction in the use of the rifle should be the same in both services, and one publication is sufficient for both.

We have the choice of two alternatives by which we can adopt the Infantry Drill Regulations. The first of these is to have the Secretary of the Navy issue the executive order, and supply the Army books to officers of the Navy, Marine officers being already supplied. These books are: Infantry Drill Regulations, U. S. Army;

Field Service Regulations, U. S. Army (1914); Small Arms Firing Manual (1913); Manual of Interior Guard Duty. The second of these is to adopt a new Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions for the Navy, and incorporate in it the Infantry Drill Regulations, U. S. Army. These regulations should be followed exactly, as there is no reason for any change. If this latter method were followed, it would require a board of officers and a great deal of careful work. This board should be composed principally of Marine officers, as their duties require that they be specialists in infantry work. They have accordingly had far greater experience in land operations than naval officers.

Even if it is considered impossible to adopt the Infantry Drill Regulations, there is not the slightest question but that our present Landing Force should be entirely revised. Those parts of the book as "Extended order" and "Combat," which are copied from the Infantry Drill Regulations, do not need revision, but a great deal of the rest does, and the revision should be done at once. It is most unsatisfactory to be obliged to use a book which is out-of-date in so many ways, and which for obvious reasons we are not able to comply with. The Navy naturally looks upon infantry training as purely secondary, but to the Marine Corps it is of primary importance, and the opinions and advice of marine officers in such matters should be given due consideration. We are always careful to keep up-to-date in all other matters relating to our training, and it strikes me we should make an effort in this one.

I am not an advocate of the Infantry Drill Regulations, U. S. Army, and other publications, simply because they are Army books. These books represent a standard that we can well adopt, and in adopting them can make the training of our men as infantry uniform with that of the Army infantry, which is the preponderant branch of our foot troops.



## HOW THE MARINE CORPS RECALLS SERGEANT JOHN P. POE, Jr.

Captain Frank E. Evans, U. S. M. C., Retired.

WHEN news of the death of John Prentiss Poe, jr., in France, came to this country, it carried an appeal remarkable for its widespread poignancy. For the friends who mustered under the colors of his friendship were a mighty legion recruited from universities and mining camps, clubs and trenches, the Arctic Circle and the tropics, cow-puncher and diplomat, officers and men in every branch of the service, and all knew him as Johnny Poe. He won his first laurels on the Princeton team as a deadly tackler and dodging halfback, and the fact of his relationship to the poet, Edgar Allan Poe, added lustre to his exploits on the gridiron. After leaving Princeton he found the road to adventure a compelling one. It led him from the Klondike to Jolo, from the Nevada gold fields to Central America and Mexico, and to service with the colors of his own and of two alien countries.

As a sergeant in the Marine Corps the death of Johnny Poe comes with peculiar force to the Corps. This phase of his quest for adventure is less known than that of his service with the Fifth Maryland in '98, the 23rd U. S. Infantry in the islands in '99, the Kentucky militia in 1903, on duty in connection with a mountain feud, or as a captain in the Honduran Army in 1907. Yet, in his short enlistment of three months, Sergeant Poe left behind him vivid memories of his soldierly qualities and his inborn fighting spirit.

Following Panama's revolt from Columbian rule on November 3, 1903, and the despatch of expeditionary forces under Colonels Waller and Biddle and Major Lejeune, an officer of the Corps received a letter from Poe which resulted in his enlistment. The extracts that follow give an insight into the spirit that impelled him towards adventure until a bullet ended his life under an alien flag. To Johnny Poe the acme of adventure, the greatest game in the world, was active service. For fifteen years his plans and his ambitions centered about the "little wars" and he had always a balance of money treasured up for no other purpose than to get him to the front, wherever it might be.

"I understand," he wrote, "that the *Dixie* is to take a battalion of marines to Colon from League Island next week. \* \* \* I

wouldn't mind enlisting except that I might be put to guarding some colony of land crabs 200 or 300 miles from where the fighting was going on, as in the Philippines, where the only thing our company did was to make the Sultan of Sulu sign a receipt for the 125 dollars Uncle Sam gave him. If I were to go there, to Panama, and not see any service, I would feel that if I were to go to Hades for the warmth the fires would be at least banked, if not altogether extinguished, owing to furnaces being repaired. I was introduced to some cow-punchers in New Mexico by Mike Furness, '91 (Princeton) as 'the hero of two wars, whose only wounds are scars from lying on his bunk so much.' I must outlive that reputation."

Poe's enlistment in the Corps was unique in the fact that the oath was administered to him by the Commandant of the Corps, General George F. Elliott. As he was desirous of enlisting only for the Panama service, General Elliott, armed with this letter, took him over to the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long. The adventurous spirit of the recruit and the humor of the letter appealed to both so keenly that he was enlisted with the understanding of his discharge upon the return of the Panama expedition. At that time war with Columbia should her forces invade Panama seemed a certainty. Already the outposts of their troops and of Captain Smedley D. Butler's company were within a few miles of each other. The desirability of preparing for a commission in the Corps was impressed on Poe by both the Secretary and the Commandant but he was bent not upon a career but on the adventure of the moment. Because of his previous service General Elliott made him a sergeant on the day of his enlistment. As later events showed the new recruit had very definite ideas as to the comparative values of a sergeant and a second lieutenant.

When the *Dixie* cleared for Panama with General Elliott and staff, and Major Mahoney's battalion, Sergeant Poe was assigned to duty with Captain Hopkins' company. On the isthmus the brigade was organized with Colonel Biddle's regiment at Empire, Colonel Waller's at Haut Obispo, and staff and Major Mahoney's battalion at Bas Obispo. When Captain Butler's company was organized as a mounted machine gun outfit Poe saw in its formation an admirable chance for active service and was transferred to it. It was not long before the responsibilities of a non-commissioned officer galled on his free lance proclivities. And he was honest in his conviction, despite his previous service, that he did not measure up to a ser-

geant's chevrons. When he could no longer endure those responsibilities he presented himself at office hours before Colonel Waller.

"I'd thank the Commanding Officer for reduction to the rank of private" was his soldierly way of solving the troubles that were taking the sunshine out of his life.

"A rather unusual request, Sergeant Poe," was Colonel Waller's comment. "I've had plenty of men asking for promotion. What's the idea?"

"Colonel, I don't think I'm qualified for the duties of a sergeant."

"But you've had service, and a college education. You may be a bit rusty on drill and regulations but we make allowances for that as we do for the new second lieutenants down here. We expect them to learn even if they are not competent to perform all the duties of their grade just now."

"Yes sir, I understand," said Sergeant Poe, straight as a lance and dead in earnest, "but nobody expects anything of a second lieutenant. They do of a sergeant."

So Sergeant Poe was reduced to the ranks and assigned to charge of the mule corral of the machine gun company, while the Brigade chuckled over his estimate of the dignity of a "shave tail's" estate.

The first day of his duty in the corral brought a conflict of authority between Private Poe and the private already on duty at the corral. That conflict Poe offered to settle in a characteristic way. Absolutely devoid of braggadocio, with a sunny nature and gentle instincts, he was withal a fighting man. "We'll fight it out, and if I lick you I'll run the corral. If you win you run it," was his proposition.

As he told the story afterwards the mutineer promptly agreed to a fight. But the smile for which Johnny Poe was famous faded from his face when the marine went on: "We'll fight it out down in the canal cut at sunrise. I clean Major Lucas's revolvers. We'll match for them and shoot it out."

But Poe, although he faced a sleepless night, was game. At sunrise he was at the rendezvous, wondering if he would live to see that same sun set on the Isthmus. A half hour passed and no marine. He made his way back to the corral and found his man peacefully doing "bunk fatigue." He woke him up with a touch of his broad-toed service shoe and at the end of the rough and tumble fight that followed, and in which he was incomparable, Private Poe's authority over the destinies of the mule corral was as firmly

fixed as the Washington Monument. And it was further characteristic of him that the two became fast friends.

His service with the Corps is summarized in the transcript of his military record which was forwarded to the GAZETTE by Sergeant Norman M. Shaw, from Headquarters.

POE, JOHN PRENTISS, junior.

Born February 26, 1874, in Baltimore, Baltimore County, Maryland.

Mustered into the service of the United States May 14, 1898, with Company F, 5th Maryland Volunteers; mustered out with same company, October 22, 1898.

Enlisted in the U. S. Army at Denver, Colo., August 14, 1899 and assigned to Company F, 23rd Infantry.

Discharged "by purchase" December 2, 1901.

Enlisted in the Marine Corps at Headquarters, Washington, D. C., December 24, 1903, promoted sergeant same date; carried as on 1st enlistment; with simple notation "served in U. S. Army."

Transferred to Marine Barracks, League Island, same date.

Transferred to Haut Obispo, Panama, January 17, 1904;

Transferred to Bas Obispo, Panama, February 16, 1904;

Transferred to Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C., and discharged there upon "Settlement of accounts" February 27, 1904, as a sergeant, with Character "Excellent."

Personal Description upon enlistment in U. S. M. C.

Age: 29 9-12 years.

Occupation, clerk.

Light brown eyes, Black hair, Dark complexion; height 66¼ inches; weight 161 pounds, mean circumference 35¼ inches; expansion 2½ inches; vision (Snellen) not given.

Marks and scars: Scar inner right leg.

Enlisted in Marine Corps by G. F. Elliott, Brigadier General Comdt.

His enlistment, brief as it was, was a source of great pride to Johnny Poe in his after life. He never lost touch with the activities of the Corps, and among the stories that he told with rare skill at various Princeton banquets and reunions were many that centered about his life in Panama. His letter to the Secretary of his class, written on the occasion of its tenth reunion won a cup offered for the best letter. It teemed with his cheery optimism, his keen humor and his quenchless thirst for adventure, and although it was written from Bullfrog, Nevada, through it ran quotations of prose and poetry that showed an amazing range of reading and a remarkable memory. From it we quote:

"I have told my experiences in the Philippines in our tent in '02, and the stories I picked up in the Army, Marine Corps, and on ranches are too Balzacian for publication. 'The wearing, tearing, always swearing regular army man' uses strong language in barracks, camp and guard house; and his 'brother with the bark on'—the marine and cowloop—is not more refined, for 'on the day he

gets his pay he likes to spend it free,' and he believes, as did that French writer, 'there is no wit without coarseness.' . . . . . I must close now or some of you fellows will wish the same fate for me as did Col. Waller of the Marine Corps, who is a corker, for a private in Panama. The private was up for trial, and seeing he was about to be convicted, said: 'Colonel, before sentencing me you should consider my good record. Why, *I was blown up in the Maine!*' The Colonel, after a few minutes of deep thought, replied: 'Is that so! Well, I wish you had staid up.' "

Six years after Poe's discharge as sergeant he wrote to an officer in the Corps from a hospital in Goldfield, Nevada. Two sentences are worth quoting for one shows a never forgotten ambition to serve at some time in the British Army. The other shows the old craving for a "little war."

"The hospital attendant is an Irishman," he wrote, "who soldiered seven year in India, and I have had several talks with him about the British Army. . . . . I shall be paid for coaching the tackling at Princeton next fall and can save \$80 a month here. Then let a little war start somewheres."


The story of his death is best told by an extract from *The Princeton Alumni Weekly*:

"Information from officers of the Black Watch indicates that Mr. Poe was killed instantly by a bullet, in a charge on Sept. 25 from the trenches in front of Hullock in Northern France. At the moment he fell he was advancing with bombs to another regiment. This happened about 7 o'clock in the morning, just after the great advance had begun. One of the Black Watch officers reports that he is buried with several of his comrades near a place called 'Lone Tree,' evidently on the battlefield. He had earned an offer of promotion, but it was characteristic of him that he had refused the offer. He preferred to fight in the ranks."

Previous to his service in the Black Watch he had fought in the Royal Artillery but as he complained in a letter "I am no longer in the heavy artillery but have been transferred to the Black Watch, the famous Scotch infantry regiment. I did not care for the heavy artillery for it does most of its fighting five to nine thousand yards and one never sees the enemy. The Black Watch has already been wiped out two or three times so I liked the transfer."

Much has and will be written of Johnny Poe, but that last sentence will tell more than volumes of his indomitable fighting spirit.

JOHN PRENTISS POE, Jr.



Princeton Halfback.



Sergeant of Marines.

*(Courtesy Princeton Alumni Weekly.)*



## THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION. ITS FORMATION AND OBJECTS.

**G**UANTANAMO, where Huntington's battalion won a base for the Atlantic Fleet in 1898, and fresh laurels for the Corps, was the birthplace of the Marine Corps Association. The first steps taken toward its organization were made by the officers of Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller's Provisional Brigade in the winter of 1911. While the organization effected was not a permanent one, owing to unavoidable circumstances, that move was the first fruit of a long-cherished idea of the Corps. The ground broken by Colonel Waller and his officers hastened the permanent organization that followed, and the lessons of the temporary organization cleared the way toward the permanency that was later won.

On the twenty-fifth day of April, 1913, the Second Provisional Brigade of U. S. Marines, under the command of Colonel Lincoln Karmany, formed the Marine Corps Association. Colonel Karmany designated Lieutenant Colonel John A. Lejeune, Captain Harold C. Snyder and Captain Davis B. Wills, Assistant Paymaster, as the Executive Committee to act in the organization.

The Executive Committee issued the following statement and sixty officers of the Brigade enrolled as members of the new organization:

For the purpose of recording and publishing the history of the Marine Corps, publishing a periodical journal for the dissemination of information concerning the aims, purposes and deeds of the Corps, and the interchange of ideas for the betterment and improvement of its officers and men the undersigned hereby form an association to be known as

### THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION,

membership in which shall be open to all officers of the Corps.

All matters pertaining to the Association shall be transacted under the direction of an Executive Committee of three officers of the Marine Corps by a majority of the votes of the members of the Association. Upon the written request of ten per cent of the members of the Association addressed to the Secretary of the Association he shall cause an election to be held without delay to fill the places on the Executive Committee of those members of such committee named in the request.

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; *Witness* our hands and seals this twenty-fifth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and thirteen.

(Signed) J. A. LEJEUNE,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.

H. C. SNYDER,  
Captain, U. S. M. C.

D. B. WILLS,  
Captain, A. P. M., U. S. M. C.

The prospectus issued later stated "What we need is some means of bringing our officers closer together, as well as an organized system of education. We believe that the publication of articles prepared by officers, together with the criticisms of such articles by other officers, will offer an incentive to officers to study professional subjects with a view to preparing other articles themselves for publication and distribution to the service. In this way the knowledge and experience of each officer will be available to every other officer. In time, we will publish a semi-annual, quarterly or monthly magazine devoted entirely to service interests."

The recurrence of expeditions hampered the aim of publishing a journal, and the activities of the officers were necessarily confined to interesting officers in the Association, and laying plans for its permanency. When the appointment of Colonel George Barnett as Major General Commandant of the Corps for a term of four years was made by the President in 1914, Captain Wills, who had then succeeded Captain Snyder as Secretary, cabled or telegraphed the news of the appointment to the senior Association member at every post, station, or with any fleet. It is worthy of note that the first message of congratulation to General Barnett was received by him at Culebra from the Legation Guard at Nicaragua, and on the same day one from the Legation Guard at Peking was received at Washington.

On January 18, 1915, a ballot was sent out by the Association for the choice of a Board of Control, of which the Commandant was to be President, and two other officers, to take office for the year beginning July 1, 1915. The Board of Control for the year was announced as follows: President, Major General Barnett, Commandant; Colonel George Richards and Colonel John A. Lejeune, and the Constitution as adopted was published.

At an informal meeting of the Board of Control in the Commandant's office, in June, 1915, Captain Frank E. Evans, retired, was elected Secretary and Treasurer. It was determined at this meeting that it was the sense of the Board of Control that the annual dues, designated in the Constitution as not to exceed \$10.00 per annum for active members, with dues of associate members to be later determined, should be reduced on July 1, 1916, to \$5.00, further reductions to be made thereafter when the finances of the Association warranted such reduction. The principle of compensation for the Secretary and Treasurer, not to exceed \$50.00 per month, was also agreed to.

At a second informal meeting in the fall of 1915 it was decided that the Association should publish a quarterly magazine to be known as THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE.

On October 15, 1915, the accounts of the Treasurer, Captain Davis B. Wills, were audited by three members of the Association: Captain James T. Bootes, Captain William Hopkins and Captain Lovick Pinkston, retired, and Captain Evans assumed his duties as Secretary and Treasurer. This audit showed a balance in bank of \$1271.39 with no liabilities or unpaid accounts.

On October 27, 1915, with the sanction of the Board of Control, the Secretary mailed every officer of the Corps on the active and retired lists, a circular letter in which was embodied an authoritative statement, in detail, of the increase of the Corps recommended by the Navy Department to Congress, a resume of the National Rifle Match, in which the Marine Corps won second place, and other matters of interest.

The initial, or first meeting of the Board of Control was held in the office of the Major General Commandant, at Washington, at 3 o'clock on January 17, 1916, with a full attendance and the substance of the informal meetings was made a matter of record in the minutes of the meeting.


The Secretary and Treasurer submitted a statement of his accounts showing total receipts of \$1354.55, expenditures of \$36.86 and a balance of \$1317.69 with no liabilities or unpaid accounts. Colonel Richards, as Committee of One, was appointed to audit the accounts, and reported that he had examined vouchers, verified balances, and certified to the correctness of the report.

Other business transacted at the meeting related to the publication of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, and fixing the sum of \$3.00, a part of the annual dues, to be set aside as subscription price to the GAZETTE. The question of admitting non-commissioned officers of the Marine Corps to associate membership, above a fixed rank, was discussed and it was decided to submit this matter to a mail vote at the time of the election of the new Board of Control. In the interim the privilege of subscription to the GAZETTE was extended to non-commissioned officers.

The Secretary was also empowered to embody news matter of interest, and not confidential in their nature, to members of the Association by circular letter in addition to the publication of the GAZETTE. The Board of Control then adjourned, subject to call.

The general form of this initial number of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE will be followed in the succeeding issues. Officers are urged, however, to contribute ideas as to departments that should, in their opinion, be made a regular feature of the GAZETTE, and to submit articles or the themes for articles. With the wide variety of professional subjects suggested by defense base work, service with the fleets, expeditions, street fighting, rifle practice, aviation, artillery, mining, signalling, handling of troops, the civil functions attending occupation, and historical articles there is no dearth of material. The translation of articles from foreign authorities presents a fascinating field, and an opportunity to keep the Corps abreast of the best thought in professional circles abroad. There are many sources for historical articles that have not been fully covered in Cullom's History of the Corps, and much has happened since its publication that should be of vital interest. The origin of the words and the air of the Corps' song, "From the Halls of Montezuma," the significance of customs of the Corps, the development of its uniform, and countless other details can be placed in permanent form through the medium of the GAZETTE.





GUANTANAMO, CUBA.  
(The Birthplace of The Marine Corps Association.)



## THE MADNESS OF CRANSTON.

Reprinted from the *Popular Magazine* of May 7, 1914.

By Captain Frank E. Evans, U. S. M. C., Retired.

The strange story of the only white man who took the "oath of blood" and gained initiation into the Katipunan, the infamous secret society of the Filipinos

**B**LACK smudges were drifting to leeward from the funnels, and the speed cones were calling for full cruising speed when Cranston's name first came up. Signal flags, gaudy in their mosaics of yellow, red, and blue as a college boy's neckwear, were whipping out to the breeze in deep-sea talk of coal reports. Lean turret guns swung from port to starboard in the never-ending drill. Dusk fell, and off to windward and dead astern of us in the double-column formation of the fleet the red and white Ardois lights winked news of the next day's routine, while we—we still talked of Cranston and his day's work that had begun in the fleet and ended tragically in a Philippine jungle.

We had left the cinder-coated decks for the wardroom country, and waited for Radcliffe, the junior surgeon—for Radcliffe had been in at the death—to take up the tale in his own time.

"Since I was the last man who saw him in the uniform of his corps, and the first to talk with him when he came back, clad in the makeshift clothes of a native," Radcliffe began, "there are some things that the service should know. Oddly enough, the first time I saw Cranston, he was dealing out hard justice to a deserter, a private in his own guard. A devilish coincidence. Right at the start I gained a curious insight into that remarkable youngster's code of the service. He was barely twenty-five at the time, but a veteran of three campaigns. I had just reported on the *Buccaneer* at Portland, and had come up on deck from the captain's cabin.

"A deserter, one of Cranston's marines, had come out in the running boat to give himself up. His beard was untrimmed, his shoes broken, his clothing ragged. He was a man beaten at every angle. Cranston stood a few paces from him, coldly impersonal, until the executive came aft. Then the deserter's feet shot together, he braced out of his slouch, and his hand came smartly up to the salute. The 'exec' returned it involuntarily, for he knew that outcast had been in the service at some time. A few incisive questions, and he turned to Cranston.

"'Captain Cranston, this man says his name is Roberts, deserted this ship at New York three months ago, one of your men.'

"Cranston smiled. 'One of my men, sir? Never saw him before.'

"I could see the deserter, as he claimed to be, wince as though Cranston had struck him.

"'Also says he came to give himself up. Walked and rode "blind baggage" to catch the ship here.' The 'exec's' face was a study as he waited for Cranston's answer.

"'The man is a faker, sir. Roberts jumped ship in uniform, and he was a clean man. This—this hobo is in 'cits' clothing and no man in my guard ever looked like that, sir. I'll send for the first sergeant. He can verify what I tell you.'

"Sullivan, a grizzled old Irish soldier man, who always carried a swagger stick ashore, and who worshipped Cranston, was on deck in a minute. Before the 'exec' could say a word, Cranston cut in coolly:

"'Sergeant, take a good look at this man. Claims to be Roberts. Did you ever see a man like that in the guard?' It was clear-cut and cold-blooded, and I saw his eyes riveted on Sullivan's face. You remember them, cold and gray, the eyes that ask and give no odds?

"Sullivan's answer came slow and measured like the throb of the screws when we slow down to pick up targets: 'I never did, sir. Roberts was a smart soldier, sir.'

"Then again Cranston questioned the corporal of the guard, and the answer was the same. The man's head dropped, and one broken shoe cracked nervously on the deck. Then, without a word, he turned forlornly and shuffled down the port gangway and into the running boat alongside. I heard the coxswain sing out his orders, the swish of the cutter's blades, and I turned to go below. Then a strange thing happened.

"I had been so satisfied by the decisive answers of Cranston and his noncoms that I had no doubt but that the man really was an imposter, an audacious bidder for at least a square meal at the expense of the commissary. But in the stern sheets of the cutter just rounding our quarter the man had jumped to his feet. His face was purple with rage, and he cursed every officer on board, swinging his tattered derby like a hammer at every word. He cursed us by name and title, and yelled the numbers of his sea bag, his rifle, and hammock at us. They were right, too. Then he began to enlarge bit-

terly on the lineage of Cranston until the scandalized coxswain pulled his feet out from under him.

"'Shut up, Roberts,' I heard him growl, 'or I'll break a boat stretcher over your leather neck.'"

"Why in thunder did Cranston do that?" broke in Ledyard.

"Some one pass me a tailor-made cigarette and I'll tell you. Thanks, Hallowell. It was some weeks afterward before I felt that I knew him well enough to ask. I had come to know him, as you did, as efficient in the extreme, a good shipmate, keen as any officer in the service. He often suggested to me the cold-blooded efficiency of a great steel plant reduced to the terms of one man. He listened with a cool smile and said:

"'Medico, I had a green guard when you joined, only three old-timers besides the noncoms. They needed the fear of God whipped into their souls worse than the corps needed a deserter. They'll remember all through their enlistment that Roberts broke faith with the service, and that when he came back the service would have none of him. That man was filthy where Roberts was clean, a bum where Roberts was as smart a man as any in the ship's company. He may have been Roberts, but he wasn't Roberts to me.'"

"'But the first sergeant and the corporal,' I asked, 'didn't they recognize him as well as the coxswain of that cutter? Hadn't they even messed with him?'"

"'They didn't tell the "exec" so,' smiled Cranston, and his eyes rested deliberately on mine, and I knew that—well, that the two noncoms had told the 'exec' only what Cranston had willed they should," and Radcliffe laughed nervously.

"He hated a dirty man worse than a sailor hates a sea-bag thief," I said. "As to his ethics, one thing is sure, they were honest."

"Well," Radcliffe put down his glass of Scotch and took up the tale again, "he was detached and ordered out to the islands soon after. I went out the next year and was attached to his battalion at Olongapo. We got to be close friends, and I saw him go through a change there that left me groping in the dark for weary months before the truth came to me after the fight at Salingan. Billy just said that Cranston hated a dirty man. I wouldn't call the Filipinos that—they have no word that expresses more disgust than their word for unclean, *sucio*—but how he despised them. There never was a white man on the frontiers of his race who had a greater contempt for an alien one. He had proved the Malay's utter inferiority to

his own satisfaction too well down in Samar and in the few brushes about Zambales Province. He carried a cavalry carbine on the hikes, and I remember one story he told me about a fight in Samar. Walton's men were sweeping the lower end of the island clean as a whistle. One day Cranston and a squad of six marines flushed a band of ladrones. Two volleys decimated them, and they picked off the rest, all but one, as they scurried back into the bush. He got away down a trail to the beach, Cranston after him. Cranston broke the hombre's ankle at five hundred yards, but the poor devil went limping along over the sharp coral. Then Cranston tried him prone, and his shot kicked up a spurt of white in the coral twenty yards short. The next took him between the shoulders."

"He was a witch with the rifle," commented Hallowell.

"I remonstrated with him, told him a plucky beggar like that deserved a better fate. Cranston laughed and turned his eyes on me.

"'He was only a Malay, medico, at war with us. He made one less, and one more on this.' With that he pulled the carbine out from its case and pointed to a notch along the stock. The end one in a double row of notches, it looked to me for all the world like the jaws of a shark."

"There never was a better chap, though," I maintained stoutly.

"I only tell it to illustrate his attitude toward the Malay," answered Radcliffe. "It was his utter exclusion of all else but the good of the service that was the mainspring in all his motives."

The stroke of "two bells" came muffled to the wardroom country, and Hallowell, as one might say "it must be time for dinner," remarked, "Time for the poker game in the steerage." No one moved, for we knew that Radcliffe was coming to the amazing desertion of Cranston from the service.

"Then came the smallpox scare," he went on, "and Cranston was the only one who went down with it. Before that, however, I must tell you how completely, how absolutely he seemed to change from his contempt and hatred of the natives. Without warning he began to cultivate them, to go to their dull *bailes* and foot it about the bamboo floors with slipperless mestizas; to spend Sunday mornings at the cockpits and his afternoons off with Raymundo, shooting wild pigeon and pigs back in the hills. Raymundo had been a colonel in the insurrectos, and rumor had it that he had been active in the Katipunian Society. The facility with which Cranston had picked up

the jaw-breaking Tagalog dialect surprised me as much as anything until he told me that his knowledge of Sanskrit, learned at college, made it easy. It seems that all those dialects in the islands are full of Sanskrit derivatives.

"The major came in from a ride up the province about that time, madder than a fire-control officer over target-practice dispersions, and Cranston was at the bottom of it. The major had seen him in a native shack at San Narcisco, squatting on his heels for all the world like a native, in conversation with the dignitaries of that barrio. Unlike his predecessor, the major had as rigid views about social equality, as applied to the Filipinos, as Cranston once had. He had Cranston up that evening after mess, and threatened to have him sent back to the States. Cranston told him he'd resign first and stay out in the islands as a civilian, and the major dropped it.

"Then came the smallpox, evidently picked up in one of the native villages on Cranston's calling list. We were under tentative orders to China then, so Cranston's stock went pretty low. The upshot of it was that we quarantined him in a tent along the strip of beach between the post and the native town. I went out with him.

"I'll never forget those days," and Radcliffe's voice dropped to a lower level, "for then I really got to know Cranston. His case was a light one, and I could have returned him to duty a week earlier. It would have made no difference, though," and he shook his head sadly. "Cranston's mind must have been made up before he got the smallpox. One night we talked clear through to dawn. We could hear the sentries calling off the hours until 'two bells and a-l-l's w-e-l-l!' and the fireflies had gone and the vampire bats were wheeling home off Grande Island. The talk was mostly about the Katipunans, then at its greatest tide since Rizal was shot on the Luneta by a file of Spanish soldiers. I was amazed to find out how much he knew about it. Pilar had organized it as an offshoot of Spanish masonry, and Cranston claimed that in Cavite Province, its hotbed, there were nearly a half million members.

"One night, by the favor of Raymundo, he had lain in a cane thicket back by Subig and watched a meeting. They wore green masks, their emblem of hope, but Cranston believed that the green would soon give way to red, the war masks. A triangle, the emblem with which we were all familiar, stood for the idea that each new Katipunero was to attract two more members to occupy the opposite angles, an endless chain of triangles. I never thought then that

Cranston was destined to fill out one of the angles. The Nilad was the mother lodge, and the initiated were called 'brethren.' There had been no initiations the night he had lain in the jungle, and I could see that he was keen to pick up its details. Of course, you know that their aim had been to overthrow Spanish rule, and, not content with their past, they were getting under way to try the same on us.

"I could see how it fascinated him, its mysterious, symbolic rites, its uncanny powers for evil, and I jokingly accused him of being a member; one of Raymundo's endless chains. I'll never forget how he looked me full in the face with those cold gray eyes and said, without a smile, 'Medico, no white man ever broke into the Katipunán. Lord, man, think what he could do if he did.' Five minutes later we were out in the bay, taking our morning swim, and the sun was climbing out of the China Sea. I had no old-fashioned ideas about quarantine, and every day we took a plunge, and then Cranston would take his carbine and a belt full of dumdum governments and go up in the hills."

Radcliffe stopped and caught up a fresh cigarette from the teak-wood box on the transom. His hand trembled when he lighted it, and the faint lap of the sea against the ship's outer skin and the rumble of the ash hoist made the silence of the room uncomfortable. A few deep puffs, and he went on in the same low intonation that betokened the strain of the story.

"You chaps know that he never came back from that morning hike except for the few terrible moments at Salingan. We had to face two alternatives. He was either dead in the hills, with native dogs fighting over his bones, or—he had deserted. Slowly at first, although no one ventured to say so openly, the latter belief won. His queer intimacy with the natives, the uncanny grip that the islands had fastened on him, his marked restlessness—all pointed that way. At times I thought of the Katipunán, but not until after Salingan did I mention it. The idea was too fantastic. The subject tacitly became taboo, for in the history of the corps there had never been a desertion by a commissioned officer. Cranston's name was not only dropped from the muster rolls, but the battalion had apparently blotted it out from memory.

"Then luckily came field service, an uprising in Luzon that threatened wide-spread insurrection once more. I found myself wishing passionately that Cranston would come back from the hills, for he was, above all, a field soldier. Before we got our marching orders

from Manila, rumors came up to the post of a white renegade posing as a mad priest, with the rebels, as they had a few times before during our occupation. Cranston's name was never mentioned, but it was uppermost in the thoughts of the battalion. It blotted out the old whirlwind of joy that used to sweep through the marines when such orders came. There was only a grim determination to smash the first outfit we met and—to get Cranston.

"After a few skirmishes and night attacks we were brigaded, along with the Cavite battalion, with the army outfit under Derrick. The main body of the insurrectos had fallen back on the old Spanish fortifications at Salingan, and our native scouts brought in word that skillful field works had brought the famous stronghold up to an even greater efficiency than it had boasted under the days of Weyler and Blanco. Field engineering, I knew, had been Cranston's hobby, for he had graduated from Lehigh before he entered the service. The regiment knew it, too, and the felling that had smoldered so bitterly broke out openly. It was bad enough to have the scandal in the corps, but to have the world learn it in this fashion—that hurt.

"We found the usual pitfalls and obstacles on the march: Sunken pits sewn with bamboo stakes and hidden by cogon grass, but with devilish variations. They showed the science of a white man's army interwoven with the cunning of the jungle people. Oddly enough, they bothered us little. An infantryman on point duty fell into a pit the second day out and was fished out with a bamboo splinter in one leg. The advance guard found a strip of crimson cloth tied to a split of bahuca fiber at the pit's edge, and doped it out as a clumsy device of the insurrectos to put their own men on guard. What a laugh went down the line that day and the following days at the way we turned their own warnings to our advantage."

"How were the strips tied on?" asked Ledyard curiously.

"Each strip with a square knot and two half hitches."

"Sailorman fashion, eh! Queer stunt for a Philippine jungle!"

"I saw at least eight of them the day we had the advance guard. Each time we left a marine at the trap to warn the main body. Thanks to the crimson strips we came to a day's march of Salingan with but one man on the hospital list, and without a show of resistance. The first shot came as we advanced into a pass a half mile long. Our field maps showed that at the other end the pass opened

out, and that on the left flank it debouched out on the shores of Lake Cabangan. Two battalions of the Twenty-eighth Infantry were leading, then came Hatley's battery, the marines, and a battalion of the Thirty-third Infantry bringing up the rear. They were sniping at us from the rocks above, but doing little damage.

"Then came a delay as unexpected as it was unwelcome, and men began to drop in the column as the insurrectos picked up the range. The signal-corps people were with the rear guard, stringing their wires behind them and keeping in touch with Manila. The order had come in, an imperative one, to advance no farther unless we were attacked in force, or until further word came from Washington to go ahead. It was all due to some anti-imperialistic speech in the Senate and the row that the Mount Dajo fight kicked up back in the States and the administration was all for pacific measures. You can imagine the streaks of blue that went up from that snaky column of khaki."

"I can imagine the combined efforts of doughboys, artillerymen, and sea soldiers," laughed Hallowell, "to say nothing of the sincere efforts of your army teamsters. But, if my Philippine history is correct, you went on."

"We did. You see it was no secret that Derrick was out for his brigadier's stars. He was on the eve of retirement, and he had been jumped by too many juniors not to make the most of Salingan. He foxed Manila pretty cleverly. We were already in the pass, and it was impossible to rest there and wait for the word from Manila for our next move. To go back, Derrick knew, would gum the whole campaign and put a terrible dent in our prestige in the islands. Therefore, he decided to withdraw from an untenable position by going ahead. Salingan was just beyond the pass."

"Clever old scout," murmured Ledyard.

"Not the only snappy stunt he pulled off. We had had enough of the old stories of boloed outposts and stolen rifles from the southern islands, and we were determined to wind up the campaign with a whirl. We streamed through that pass on the double, bullets whining against the rocks and kicking up the dust on our flanks. The insurrectos were at their old trick of firing with rifles from which they had chopped off the front sights to get a better aim, and their shooting was almost a joke. Just outside the pass we rushed two small outworks, and my heart sank into my puttees.

I had seen gun emplacements so like them out on Grande Island that I could not mistake the handiwork. They were Cranston's. You remember, Billy?" and he turned to me.

"Right," I answered. "The time we mounted the five-inch from Cavite on Grande for the maneuvers Cranston designed every foot of the emplacements from the glacis to the magazines."

"We took them easily enough, but a determined force could have enfiladed us from them with heavy losses. We surmised that they had drawn in their lines to the cover of Salangan's walls and had let them go by default. We went into camp to give the men a rest and their noonday chow before closing in on the old fortress. All hands were keen to finish the trick before any other messages came over the wires from Manila, and Derrick had a scheme that worked like a new shift play from a Western gridiron. He sent two companies of the Twenty-eighth ahead, ostensibly for reconnaissance, but with instructions tantamount to drawing the fire of the enemy and then the simulation of a disorganized retreat. It was well staged and the insurrectos bit. A horde of them poured out of the old fortress, and some of their shots from a ragged volley dropped into the mule corral on our flank nearest the lake. There was much profanity, and a wounded mule stampeded out of the lines.

"That was all that Derrick needed; he could report that he had been attacked in force. Hatley's guns opened up at easy range, and after they had played tattoo on the Spanish masonry cunningly, the foot troops moved forward in line of two columns, deploying as the country opened up ahead. We were within six hundred yards before their return fire had any effect. Then it was a storming rush by platoons under a hail of flying slugs, pieces of brass, and the sobbing flight of more modern projectiles from the varied ordnance of the natives' ranks, now intrenched behind the walls. A marine fell back, his face streaming with blood, crying with rage. I made a jump for him and he waved me away. 'One of them blasted niggers hit me—in the face—with a—with a—rock!' he shouted. Then the full indignity of the insult burst on him, and he rushed back into the scrap, working the bolt handle of his Krag with the speed of an automatic rifle. We were now within three hundred yards of the big moat that ran around three faces of Salangan, and the details were rushing up the ladders for the final assault. Word was passed to lie prone and let Hatley's guns, now on the left flank, take a close-

range hammering at the walls in hopes of making a breach. Then came the dramatic climax to the fight at Salingan.

"Before the guns could begin their tattoo a man in crimson robes, flowing like the garments of a priest, leaped on the ramparts of the old fortress and held both arms extended above his head. The fire of the natives stopped like magic. His face was covered with a crimson mask, the war mask of the Katipunan. His arms moved like well-ordered flails, and they were spelling out a message in the wigwag code of the navy. The word flashed from flank to flank of the line, and Hatley's guns were silent. Fifteen hundred men in khaki lay in the beating sun, watching with parched lips and aching eyes those swift-moving crimson arms. All down the front of the marine regiment the sea soldiers were spelling out the message aloud. There was wonder in their voices, and it boomed out to the infantry and artillery like the chant of a male choir.

"I have set slow fuse to magazine. It will blow up in five minutes. Withdraw by rushes simulating retreat. Send two companies left flank after explosion. Only trail survivors can take."

"The arms swung three times to show the message was finished, and again they rose slowly. I could hear the marines panting from more than the heat, for every man jack of them was waiting tensely for the signature that was coming.

"C-r-a-n-s-t-o-n."

"No thought of a trick came to any of us. It was too weird, too oppressive for that, and it was as though we had been watching a man daring death and torture with every stroke of his crimson arms. The bugles sounded the retreat, then the double, and as we raced back to the zone of safety men were crying and stumbling, all unstrung, in the marines. They greeted our withdrawal with high-pitched yells, for they evidently thought their mad priest had driven us back by magic incantations, and their patchquilt variety of ordnance blazed away. Then came the explosion. The walls of Salingan opened up like papier-mache. There were mighty few survivors to take the secret trail on the left flank. We searched the ruins and the bush vainly for Cranston.

"Not until we came across a casement did we find even a sign of his presence there. The casement had been draped in black cloth, and here and there, under the rubble, we made odd finds. Cranston's sacerdotal robes were in one corner, beneath them the

war mask. Across the robes was the black triangle of the Katipunán, like this:



"Nearby we found the war flag of the Katipunán, red and blue, with a sun in the center encircled by seven stars. There were other bits of mummery. Derrick looked solemnly at each article as it was handed to him. 'Not only Salingan has fallen for the first time in its bloody history, men, but with it a stronghold of the K. K. K.,' he said slowly. Then Carstairs of the marines spoke up: 'Colonel Derrick, the next fall will be a brace of silver stars for your shoulder straps.' That brought a cheer that made old Derrick chew his mustaches grimly, and made us forget, for the moment, poor Cranston's fate.

"Tattoo sounded that night over a tired outfit, but the notes had barely died before a Krag barked from an outpost. A cry in English followed it and then a second shot. I was at headquarters when two bewildered infantrymen carried Cranston in. A blot of red was widening on the native camisa he wore when I kneeled over him. 'It's Radcliffe, Cranston.' He opened his eyes, the same cold gray ones, without a flicker in them to betray emotion or pain. Aside from that he was sadly changed, poor devil." The medico's voice broke. "'I know, medico,' he whispered, 'saw you out there—on the firing line—with my old buck marines.' 'You're going to get well, old man,' I told him, but he shook his head. 'That last shot from the outpost got me here,' he whispered, 'the first one in the belly, good shooting.' Then before I could stop him he ripped the camisa away from his chest and rested his hand on a bundle of documents tied about it. His hand was bloody when I gently pulled it away. I cut the cords away from the papers and handed them to Derrick.

"Cranston was delirious after that. He raved about a room draped in black and a table with a human skull on it. And as we listened and heard him babble of *pacto-de-sangre*, the 'oath of blood,' we knew that he was baring for us the secrets of his initiation into

the Katipuneros; the initiation of the only white man who had ever been received into the Supreme Society of the Sons of the People, as the Filipinos prefer to call the Katipunan. 'Skull—cross-bones—two candles—triangle,' he rambled on, 'I signed—dagger—white man's blood.' There was horror in his voice. Then he made swift signs with his left hand, and cried, in a clear voice that carried out into the fringe of hushed men about headquarters tent, 'Brethren.' He died with it on his lips, and the bugles were sounding taps for Derrick's column before Salingan."

"The documents?" asked Ledyard after a decent interval.

"A complete expose of the K. K. K., list of lodges and officers of Nilad—the mother lodge—brief military plan of the proposed uprising in Manila the night of April twenty-seventh, the men who were financing it, both natives and European business men, details of the initiation, in short, everything that the insular government and the service had only guessed at. They filled many a gap, closed many a broken link for the Bureau of Insular Affairs back in Washington. The uprising never came off. Some prominent native statesmen and well-known business men who represented foreign houses were missing from the clubs and the Escolta in Manila soon after. They're still in exile. On the other hand—Salingan taken without the loss of a man, Derrick's silver stars have fallen, campaign medals for the outfit, the Katipunan an ugly memory."

"But Cranston?"

"That," said Radcliffe slowly, "each man must decide for himself. Nearly all of the evidence is in. When he raved that night about the oath he had subscribed to in his own blood, I found myself wondering. An oath was a solemn thing to him."

"More so than the one he took with his first commission?" I asked skeptically.

"No, not when the acid test came. My theory is that he deliberately left the service to master the secrets of the K. K. K. There was much of the Eastern fatalism, the cold-bloodedness of it, in Cranston, despite his old antipathy to the natives. After he took the *pacto-de-sangre* the fascination of his new life may have carried him away. I believe that it did, but that the sight of our lines that day, his old battalion in the center, broke the last of the spell. He must have been coming into our lines that night to give us the documents, not trying to break through. Even before that he must have betrayed their sunken pits to us with his red strips tied on in sailor-

man fashion. I held my friendship with Cranston too high to do him an injustice. Kipling says of the East and the West 'and never the twain shall meet.' They came nearer with Cranston than with any other Anglo-Saxon I ever knew of, but they didn't quite bridge the gap."

We were tilting the bottle of Scotch, silent with the mystery of it all, when a messenger stepped inside. "Last radiogram for the night, sir," and he handed us a manifold copy.

I glanced over it, read off the football scores, and then a paragraph detached itself and stood out from the paper with the sharpness of a bayonet edge. I read it slowly, and again the lap-lap of the sea outside came into the quiet of the wardroom.

WASHINGTON.—The name of Captain Stephen Cranston was restored to the list of the marine corps today by the order of President Wilson. Captain Cranston was dropped as a deserter in the Philippines several months ago. In the capture of Salingan in June by the forces under General Derrick, recently promoted, Cranston, then serving with the insurrectos as a head priest of the Katipunan, fired the magazine of the fortress. He was afterward fatally shot while entering the American lines under cover of darkness, but brought with him documents that resulted in the utter extermination of the once powerful secret society. The chief of the bureau of insular affairs has just discovered evidence that clearly shows Cranston deserted to join the Katipunan and await his first opportunity to rejoin the service with the information thus gained. His body will be interred at Arlington on Wednesday with unusual military honors. Congress voted Captain Cranston a medal of honor today, overriding for the first time the absence of authority in law under which naval and marine officers are not eligible to receive it, although the enlisted men of these services and the officers and men of the army are.

"Congress carried away the whole target, raft, screen, and all on that shot," was Hallowell's verdict.



## BRITISH MARINES IN THE WAR.

### ANTWERP AND THE DARDANELLES.

**F**ROM the Recruiting Supplement of the *London Times* we reproduce the following:

*"It would take the mainsail of a corvette to contain the honours of this magnificent Regiment of Foot."*—WILLIAM IV.

There is no theatre of war where British arms are represented in which the Royal Marines have not played their part and upheld their traditions. The corps mans and fights about a quarter of the guns of the Fleet, and also finds small-arm parties for landing and other purposes. In addition it is employed in a variety of capacities, as in coast defence batteries, heavy and light artillery brigades, an infantry brigade, and medical, field engineers, supply and transport, and submarine miners units. To meet these requirements the corps has reached the greatest expansion in its record of 250 years. Except on the North-West Frontier of India, units furnished by the Royal Marines are now present in the various expeditionary forces throughout the Empire.

#### ENLISTMENT AND SERVICE.

To fill the gaps in their ranks and to keep their complement at full strength the Marines are now calling for recruits. Men may join either for long service or for the period of the war. According as they make their choice so their training will vary, for the long-service Marine will be taught to fulfill his double purpose of "soldier and sailor too."

The Marines, though part of the Naval forces, are in the first instance soldiers, and trained as soldiers; but as their life is spent for the most part on board ship, a thorough course of instruction in naval gunnery and other naval subjects follows their military training. The man who joins for the period of the war will probably be trained only as a soldier.

The Royal Marines are divided into the Royal Marine Artillery, with headquarters at Eastney, and the Royal Marine Light Infantry, with its depot at Deal and headquarters at Chatham, Gosport, and Portsmouth. Recruits to the R.M.A. are sent at once to Eastney, recruits to the R. M. L. I., if for long service, to Deal, for the first part of their training, and later to one of the "divisions"; if for war service to either one or the other. The long-service infantry recruit spends usually six months at infantry training before passing on to the gunnery course and sea training. The war-service recruits are generally passed out in slightly less time. The war-service recruit wears khaki, the long-service man the blue uniform and "Brodrick" cap which the Marines still retain.

Young men between the ages of 18 and 23 are accepted for long service, and between 19 and 38 for the period of the war. The physical standards for war recruits are:—For the Marine Artillery, height 5ft. 7in., chest 35in.; for the Light Infantry, height 5ft. 3½in., and chest 34in. Every recruit must undergo a medical examination and prove that he is strong, vigorous, and healthy, and must have had a good general education. The private's pay in the Artillery branch is from 8s. 2d. to 9s. 4d. a week, and in the Infantry branch from 8s. 2d. to 9s. 11d. Extra "efficiency pay" can be earned, and men of certain rank qualified in gunnery can obtain further pay ranging from 7s. to 10s. 6d. a week. Men employed on shore receive extra pay for special

duties, and men with the knowledge of certain trades may add considerably to their pay. Separation allowances are made on the usual basis.

The Marines have a long and glorious history, and their motto, "Per Mare per Terram," sums up the double nature of their service. They are one of the most self-contained of corps. In their barracks they provide for all the needs of their men under training, being practically independent of outside contractors. Clothes and boots are made on the spot, the barracks have their own stores, butchers' shops, and even dispensary. Every care is taken to provide for the leisure hours of the men. Recreation rooms, reading, writing, and billiard rooms are provided, and the barracks even boast their own theatres, visited regularly by travelling companies.

#### COURSE OF TRAINING.

The training of the recruit contains a large element of physical drill, which at the depot at Deal is carried out in a very enlightened manner, and reflects again the ideal of the Marine to be ready for any emergency.

The aim of the training is not only to increase the men's physical fitness but also to quicken their brains and give them as much agility as possible.

During the first two or three weeks of his training the recruit is instructed in the duties of sentries, &c., he is employed on fatigue, and later has two or three weeks devoted to musketry. Next he undergoes a course of field training, and the last two weeks of his course are given up to infantry drill on parade. Then, as has been said, if he is a long-service recruit, he passes on to his division at Chatham, Gosport, or Plymouth, for further training, before joining his ship, or if he is a war-service recruit he is probably drafted immediately to the Dardanelles. Whether he is one or the other his training as infantryman has made him a very efficient soldier, and he will take a pride in living up to the traditions of a corps of whom Earl St. Vincent once said: "There never was an appeal made to them for honour, courage, or loyalty that they did not more than fulfill my expectations. If ever the hour of real danger should come to England, the Marines will be found the country's sheet anchor."

The following official dispatches on the defence of Antwerp are also reproduced from the *London Times*:

*From Sir J. D. P. French, Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, to the Secretary of the Admiralty.*

In forwarding this report to the Army Council at the request of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I have to state that, from a comprehensive review of all the circumstances, the force of Marines and Naval Brigades which assisted in the defence of Antwerp was handled by General Paris with great skill and boldness.

Although the results did not include the actual saving of the fortress, the action of the force under General Paris certainly delayed the enemy for a considerable time, and assisted the Belgian Army to be withdrawn in a condition to enable it to reorganize and refit, and regain its value as a fighting force. The destruction of war material and ammunition—which, but for the intervention of this force, would have proved of great value to the enemy—was thus able to be carried out.

The assistance which the Belgian Army has rendered throughout the subsequent course of operations on the canal and the Yser river has been a valuable asset to the allied cause, and such help must be regarded as an outcome of the intervention of General Paris's force. I am further of opinion that the moral effect produced on the minds of the Belgian Army by this

necessarily desperate attempt to bring them succour, before it was too late, has been of great value to their use and efficiency as a fighting force.

J. D. P. FRENCH,  
Field-Marshal,  
Commanding-in-Chief.

*From Major-General A. Paris, C.B., Commanding Royal Naval Division, to the Secretary of the Admiralty.*

31st October, 1914.

Regarding the operations round Antwerp from 3rd to 9th October, I have the honour to report as follows:—

The Brigade (2,200 all ranks) reached Antwerp during the night 3rd-4th October, and early on the 4th occupied, with the 7th Belgian Regiment, the trenches facing Lierre, with advanced post on the River Nethe, relieving some exhausted Belgian troops.

The outer forts on the front had already fallen and bombardment of the trenches was in progress. This increased in violence during the night and early morning of 5th October, when the advanced posts were driven in and the enemy effected a crossing of the river, which was not under fire from the trenches.

About midday the 7th Belgian Regiment was forced to retire, thus exposing my right flank. A vigorous counter-attack, gallantly led by Colonel Tierchon, 2nd Chasseurs, assisted by our aeroplanes, restored the position late in the afternoon.

Unfortunately, an attempt made by the Belgian troops during the night (5th-6th October) to drive the enemy across the river failed, and resulted in the evacuation of practically the whole of the Belgian trenches.

The few troops now capable of another counter-attack were unable to make any impression, and the position of the Marine Brigade became untenable.

The bombardment, too, was very violent, but the retirement of the Brigade was well carried out, and soon after midday (6th October) an intermediate position, which had been hastily prepared, was occupied.

The two Naval Brigades reached Antwerp during the night, 5th-6th October. The 1st Brigade moved out in the afternoon of 5th to assist the withdrawal to the main 2nd Line of Defence.

The retirement was carried out during the night, 6th-7th October, without opposition, and the Naval Division occupied the intervals between the forts on the 2nd Line of Defence.

The bombardment of the town, forts, and trenches began at midnight, 7th-8th October, and continued with increasing intensity until the evacuation of the fortress.

As the water supply had been cut, no attempt could be made to subdue the flames, and soon 100 houses were burning. Fortunately, there was no wind, or the whole town and bridges must have been destroyed.

During the day (8th October) it appeared evident that the Belgian Army could not hold the forts any longer. About 5.30 p. m. I considered that if the Naval Division was to avoid disaster an immediate retirement under cover of darkness was necessary. General De Guise, the Belgian Commander, was in complete agreement. He was most chivalrous and gallant, insisting on giving orders that the roads and bridges were to be cleared for the passage of the British troops.

The retirement began about 7.30 p. m., and was carried out under very difficult conditions.

The enemy were reported in force (a Division plus a Reserve Brigade) on our immediate line of retreat, rendering necessary a detour of 15 miles to the north.

All the roads were crowded with Belgian troops, refugees, herds of cattle, and all kinds of vehicles, making inter-communication a practical impossibility. Partly for these reasons, partly on account of fatigue, and partly from at present unexplained causes large numbers of the 1st Naval Brigade became detached, and I regret to say are either prisoners or interned in Holland.

Marching all night (8th to 9th October), one battalion of 1st Brigade, the 2nd Brigade and Royal Marine Brigade, less one battalion, entrained at St. Gilliese Waes and effected their retreat without further incident.

The Battalion (Royal Marine Brigade) Rear Guard of the whole force, also entrained late in the afternoon together with many hundreds of refugees, but at Morbeke the line was cut, the engine derailed, and the enemy opened fire.

There was considerable confusion. It was dark and the agitation of the refugees made it difficult to pass any orders. However, the battalion behaved admirably, and succeeded in fighting its way through, but with a loss of more than half its number. They then marched another 10 miles to Selzaate and entrained there.

Colonel Seely and Colonel Bridges were not part of my command, but they rendered most skilful and helpful services during the evacuation.

The casualties were approximately—

1st Naval Brigade and 2nd Naval Brigade, 5 killed, 64 wounded, 2,040 missing.

Royal Marine Brigade, 23 killed, 103 wounded, 388 missing.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A. PARIS, Major General.  
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

Further reference to the Antwerp expedition is found in the following, which is reproduced from G. H. Perris' "The Campaign of 1914 in France and Belgium," published by Henry Holt & Company, of New York.

#### THE FALL OF ANTWERP.

The comparative neglect of the great port, city, and fortified position of Antwerp both by the German high command and by the major Allies up to the end of September, and the plans for the attack upon and defense of the city, have been so little explained, and are so much open on both sides to criticisms which may be quite undeserved, that we shall be content with a brief narrative of these events. It seems probable that the French and British commanders hoped to occupy and hold north-western Belgium; that the assault upon Antwerp came before they expected it; and that, in face of large new German re-enforcements, they abandoned the design; while the German Staff deliberately left the towns between Antwerp and the coast open, to tempt the Allies into a dangerous extension of their already very frail lines. General von Beseler does not seem to have had more than 100,000 troops available against Antwerp.

The first German approach was by the south-west; but, after repulses at Audeghem and Lebbeke, villages on the south-west and south-east of Termonde, on September 26 and 27, the western roads to Antwerp were left strangely free for movements of the Allies. On the following day, Malines having been once more bombarded, the direct advance upon the Scheldt from the south and south-east began. The outer defense works here extended at a distance of about nine miles from the city along a crescent formed by the

rivers Scheldt, Ruppel, and Methe, and included eight large forts, from that of Bornem on the west, through Waelhem and Wavre Ste. Catherine (covering the Malines road), to that of Lierre, before the small town of the same name. The river sides were intrenched, and the roads blocked. There was an inner ring of forts, two or three miles outside the boundaries of Antwerp; but their guns had not the range for offense, and their position made them useless for sustained defense, since the city could be reduced to ashes before they were reached.

The Belgians used their field guns well, and held their positions in the villages and river trenches despite a terrific cannonade. The fort of Wavre Ste. Catherine was put out of action after twenty-four hours of continuous shell-fire, however, many of the garrison being killed by the explosion of the magazine; and on the night of October 1 that of Waelhem was little more than a heap of debris. No less serious than the loss of a fort (if a long resistance had been contemplated) was the destruction by shell-fire of a great reservoir giving the chief water supply of the city. On October 2, the defending troops were withdrawn behind the Nethe; and the flight of the wealthier inhabitants of Antwerp, including the British and French colonies, began. On the following evening, the first part of the British force consisting of a Marine Brigade of 2,200 men, reached Antwerp. It was followed on the afternoon of October 5 by two Naval brigades, with six heavy naval guns, two of which served on an armored train and were afterwards brought south. The Belgian Government had asked for British aid; and rumor so multiplied these 8,000 men that the Anversois could hardly contain themselves for joy and confidence. General de Guise knew it was too late. Mr. Winston Churchill, when he stood with Jack Tar in the trenches, knew it, as he probably had done when they were sent; but he knew, also, that the detention of a German army on the Scheldt might save the position in southern Flanders, while British aid would greatly fortify the morale of the Belgian troops. He afterward stated that "the Naval Division was sent to Antwerp not as an isolated incident, but as part of a large operation for the relief of the city which more powerful considerations prevented from being carried through."

Repeated attempts to make the river-crossing at Waelhem and Lierre, on the nights of October 3, 4, and 5, were defeated with heavy loss; but, at dawn on the 6th, the Belgian line was forced by a concentration of artillery and infantry attack. The British marines about Lierre and the whole of the Belgian troops were then drawn back to the inner forts for a final stand, in order to cover the retreat and the flight of the civil population. That night, the withdrawal of the army commenced. Admirably covered by cavalry, armored motor-cars, and cyclist corps, it moved out by the narrow strip of territory between the Scheldt and Dutch Zealand, toward Ghent and Ostend, the Belgian and British trenches on the south of the city keeping up a full show of resistance. In the morning, the Government and diplomatic corps left; the great oil-tanks of the Scheldt were blown up; and the machinery of many ships in harbor was disabled. The northern and western roads were now black with scores of thousands of people from Antwerp and the country around, flying to the sea and the Dutch frontier. Von Beseler's left wing was now crossing the Scheldt between Wetteren and Termonde; it would have gone very ill with the mingled masses of retreating soldiers and civil refugees had he boldly and immediately thrown his left wing forward to St. Nicholas and Lokeren. A light bombardment of Antwerp began late at night on October 7. It is thought that 500,000 people left on the following day, the greater part to cast themselves upon the splendid hospitality of the Dutch, many thousands to reach England, where homes were found for them. Amid this confusion, General de Guise's troops and most of the British contingent abandoned the forts and trenches, cut the Scheldt pontoon bridge behind them, and passed westward, successfully beating off flank and rear attacks. Unfortunately, three battalions of the 1st British Naval Brigade did not receive the orders to retire; and, ultimately, finding the Germans in

possession of Lokeren and reaching near to St. Nicholas, they either crossed the Dutch frontier and were interned, or were captured.

#### AT THE DARDANELLES.

Of all the British divisions on the Gallipoli Peninsula, none, with the exception of the 29th, has seen more and more varied work and fighting or suffered more than the Royal Naval Division. It supplied the first British troops to be landed in Gallipoli and seems likely to be the last to leave it.

The Royal Naval Division returned from Antwerp in October, and, after a period of training, was sent off to the Dardanelles in February. Two Marine battalions went in the middle of February, and at the end of the month the rest of the Division embarked at Bristol for Lemnos, which was reached on October 12. The Division, however, was not yet ready, and it was sent off to Port Said to sort out its units and its gear, which seems to have been very necessary after a hurried embarkation in England. From Egypt the Division was moved to Scyros, and there it remained until the landing in Gallipoli in April.

None of the division took part in the landing of April 25, except the Plymouth battalion of the Royal Marines, who landed with the King's Own Scottish Borderers at Y beach, really a barely scalable ravine. This whole force was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G. E. Matthews, R. M. L. I.\*

The beach at this point consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to the west of Krithia.

A large number of small gullies running down the face of the cliff facilitated the climb to the summit, and so impracticable had these precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps had been taken to defend them. Very different would it have been had we, as was at one time intended, taken Y 2 for this landing. There a large force of infantry, entrenched up to their necks, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss guns, were awaiting an attempt which could hardly have made good its footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the first instance to establish themselves on the heights, reserves of food, water, and ammunition were hauled up to the top of the cliff, and, in accordance with the plan of operations, an endeavour was immediately made to gain touch with the troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, the enemy's strong detachment from Y 2 interposed, our troops landing at X were fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately to their front, and the attempt to join hands was not persevered with.

Later in the day a large force of Turks were seen to be advancing upon the cliffs above Y beach from the direction of Krithia, and Colonel Matthews was obliged to entrench. From this time onward his small force was subjected to strong and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing to the configuration of the ground, which here drops inland from the edge of the

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#### \*LIEUT.-COLONEL MATTHEWS, R. M. L. I.

Lieut.-Colonel Godfrey E. Matthews (Pasha), Royal Marine Light Infantry, has had a long and distinguished career. From January, 1897, to 1910, he was seconded for service in the Egyptian Army, took part in the Nile operations of 1897, and was mentioned in the Sirdar's despatch on the battle of Atbara, in which he served with a Sudanese battalion. He also took part in the battle of Khartoum and in the 1899 Nile Expedition, including the first advance against the Khalifa, receiving the Egyptian Medal with four clasps. Subsequently he was decorated by the Khedive with the Order of the Medjidie, Third Class, and received from the Sirdar the thanks of the Soudan Government for his action with regard to the Mek of the Shilluks in 1903. He was made a C. B. on the Coronation of King George, and when he left Khartoum in September, 1913, the following order of the day was published: "On the departure of El Lewa Matthews Pasha, C. B., on relinquishing command of the Khartoum district, the Sirdar desires to express his appreciation of the valuable service rendered by this officer in the responsible and onerous appointment. By his untiring energy and devotion to duty Matthews Pasha has brought the troops under his command to a high state of efficiency....."—*Globe and Laurel*.

cliff, the guns of the supporting ships could render him little assistance. Throughout the afternoon and all through the night the Turks made assault after assault upon the British line. They threw bombs into the trenches, and, favoured by darkness, actually led a pony with a machine gun on its back over the defences and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted.

During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).

The reorganization of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganization could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges—in itself a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Marine Division were sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on the 28th and 29th of April. Of these battalions three were composed of the Deal, Chatham and Portsmouth Royal Marines.

On the night of May 2nd a bold effort was made to seize a commanding knoll in front of the centre of the line. The enemy's enfilading machine guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On May 4th an attempt to seize Kaba Tepe was also unsuccessful, the barbed-wire here being something beyond belief. But a number of minor operations have been carried out, such as the taking of a Turkish observing station; the strengthening of entrenchments; the reorganization of units, and the perfecting of communication with the landing-place. Also a constant strain has been placed upon some of the best troops of the enemy, who, to the number of 24,000, are constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own game.

The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has been invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral Thursby's hands, and I trust I may be permitted to say what a trusty and powerful friend he has proved himself to be to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

The Nelson Battalion and the Deal, Portsmouth, and Chatham marines were sent to Anzac, where they had to hold various parts of the then very insecure line for about 10 days, in shallow trenches which afforded but little shelter. Very heavy loss was sustained during this time. During the first week in May these various battalions were brought to Helles to join the rest of the Division and all were united under the command of General Paris, R. M. L. I.

In the three bloody general assaults of May 6, 7, and 8, the Division held the right of the British line, forming the link between the British and the French Armies. The fighting of the rest of the month consisted mostly of short night advances, and the Division made three of these, digging in on a front of 1,000 yards. The fight of June 4 was the most costly the Division has yet been in. At noon on that day the whole line from sea to sea advanced after a brief bombardment. In front of the Royal Naval Division was a double trench line with a redoubt which was to be taken by a simultaneous rush in concert with the French. Our men reached the redoubt and occupied the southern face of it in a quarter of an hour. They resolutely tried to hold on under a terrific fire. Unfortunately the French, who were to take the other half of the redoubt, were held up, and this left a gap between their left and the Royal Naval Division, who were, therefore, left exposed to a merciless fire from the crest under which their ranks literally melted away. The Collingwood battalion, which had only been a few days on the Peninsula, was sent up to reinforce, but the place was untenable and the assaulting battalions had to go back, abandoning all the ground they had won, and losing as frightfully in the retreat as in the assault. No troops could have made a braver stand. Out of 64 officers who went into the fight nine returned un wounded,

and each battalion lost from a half to two-thirds of the contingent it sent in.

Meanwhile the Nelson battalion had gallantly gone to the support of the Lancashire Division, which had advanced farther ahead and now found itself with its right exposed to an enfilade fire. The Nelson men got between the enfilading Turks and the right of the Lancashire Division, joined up the line, and dug themselves in under fire on a front of about 500 yards. The trench was completed that night and was for a time a permanent force of our front line.

On July 12 the Lowland Division took the redoubt and the crest on the right of it, and on the next day the Portsmouth and Chatham Battalions of Marines with the Nelson Battalion, charged right through the fronts of the Lowland Division, charged the Turkish trenches beyond, and got the Turks fairly running in the open. Some of them went too far and severe loss was sustained in getting back.

Six Distinguished Service Orders, nine Distinguished Crosses (the Naval decoration corresponding to the Military Cross for officers), 12 medals for conspicuous gallantry, and 54 distinguished service medals have been awarded to officers and men of the Division during the campaign.

The following letter is taken from the *Globe and Laurel*:

"I expect you have read about our doings at the Gallipoli attack; it was a very hot affair all round, but we are probably on the better side now. We landed on Wednesday evening, and were shot at from all sides by shrapnel and snipers. I was with the first maxim. We made for the trenches as quickly as possible, and there we stayed until Sunday, when we came out, as we thought, for a stand off, instead of which we were ordered to our headquarters and told to get into dug-outs before daylight, as a shrapnel bombardment was expected in a quarter of an hour.

"Then fresh orders came along: 'Get a move on at once, and join the 4th Brigade of Australians.' So we got going again, and found getting up the hill hard work. Orders kept being passed: 'Gangway!' 'Get a move on!' 'Hurry up the ammunition!' 'Come on machine guns!' 'Stand clear of the wounded!' 'Get your packs off!' 'Everybody up in the firing line!' 'Now, Australians, the R. M. L. I. are here!' 'Prepare for attack!' We got forward about 80 yards, when someone (probably a German) ordered us to retire, so we turned about and were greeted with 'You ——— fools, advance!' So off we went again across the flat as far as the third line of trenches, and the few of us left were very glad to get there. The Turks are driven forward by their German officers, and are dressed in greenish blue or khaki, and some in Australian uniform. The sniping is the worst of all, and down a gully way is worse than the firing line, as it bends, forming a death trap.

"About 2.30 a.m. we stood by for an attack. The fusillade was awful, and we called up our supports, the Australians, and held them without any casualties; then things eased down, and only sniping went on.

"Curtin was firing at a sniper when, unfortunately, he stayed up to look at the effect of his shot, and was hit under the right eye with an explosive bullet, which came out at the back of his head.

"Hatton was killed at Kaba Tepe or Anzac. He suffered very little, as he was unconscious very soon after being hit in the head and right leg, and died shortly after.

"His body was taken to the beach to a special area for burials, and marked with a wooden cross.

"He died a heroic death; the trench he was in was blown in and badly smashed up. He called his men together, and was going to make a charge when the parapet was swept with machine gun fire.

"The Marines absolutely saved the situation for the Australians many times, and also consolidated the position, as the Australians had no idea of trench-making. The Chatham and Deal Battalions have been amalgamated, and there are only three left of the original officers that left Chatham."

The following summary of killed and wounded, rank and file, of the Royal Marines, in the first year, is taken from the *Globe and Laurel*, the official publication of the Royal Marines.

	Killed.	Wounded.
TOTALS:—Royal Marine Artillery.....	1	4
Royal Marines.....	56	70
GRAND TOTALS.....	58	74
*Signifies temporary commission.		
	5	127
		132

## WARRANT AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND RANK AND FILE.

	R.M.A.	R.M.L.I.
Lost their lives at sea.....	111*	†572
Killed or died from wounds.....	2	505
Wounded.....	10	1006
Missing or interned.....	—	323
TOTALS.....	123	2556

†H.M.S. ships "Pathfinder," "Aboukir\*," "Cressy," "Hogue\*," "Hawke," "Monmouth," "Good Hope\*," "Bulwark," "Formidable," "Bayano," "Goliath\*," &c.

	N.C.O.'s and Rank and File.
Royal Marine Artillery.....	123
Royal Marine Light Infantry.....	2556
Royal Marine Band Ranks.....	45
Royal Marines (temporary).....	231

GRAND TOTAL OF CASUALTIES.....2955

R. M. Forces, 1914-1915.



## BOOK REVIEWS.

### **The New Map of Europe, by Herbert Adams Gibbons.**

The Century Company. \$2.00 net, postage 10 cents. 412 pages, 6 double maps.

This book is an illuminating one for the officer who recognizes that, to follow intelligently the giant moves of the European War, he must be firmly grounded in a knowledge of the wars and the diplomatic crises recorded in Europe for the decade immediately preceding the conflagration. Mr. Gibbons has not only been a close student of these diplomatic moves, but by years of residence in the storm center of Europe and of association with her diplomats, and by first hand knowledge of events, appears to be exceptionally qualified to impart this knowledge. The *New Map of Europe* is not a work to be scanned perfunctorily. There is too much meat condensed in each of the twenty-one chapters to suffer such treatment. His first chapter presents, with all the interest of a powerful drama, the Alsace Lorraine problem, that pressing thorn that for three decades threatened the peace of Europe. The *Weltpolitick* chapter throws a brilliant light on Germany's rapid strides in industrialism, the development of her foreign trade, her colonization policy, her stubborn determination that Great Britain, France and Russia should no longer acquire extra-territorial possessions to her exclusion, and the creation of a powerful navy to guard her commerce and challenge Great Britain's supremacy as a sea-power. The chapter devoted to the Algeciras conference and the Agadir incident, disposes of the Moroccan affairs that came so near to ushering in a European War in 1905 and again in 1911. The diplomatic moves and countermoves in Persia by Germany on the one hand and Great Britain and Russia on the other, in which he states that Germany found herself checkmated at every point, are the subjects of two other chapters. The Polish question is thoroughly dissected in another. The chapter allotted to Italian irredentism makes that movement clear, and emphasizes the bitter antagonism that has influenced Italian and Austrian relations. Of equal interest are the chapters covering the influences that the Danube and the Dardanelles have exerted upon the diplomatic struggles of Europe. The Young Turk regime is flayed by the author and he vouches for some amazing instances of apparent corruption and incapacity in the Ottoman Empire. The war between Turkey and Italy in 1911 is the subject matter of a separate chapter. Balkan affairs naturally occupy much space for

the Balkans have always been a menace to Europe's peace. The relations, the antagonisms, the characteristics and the conflicting national ambitions of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania are clearly analyzed. The Cretan question and the Macedonian problem, familiar in sound but swathed in mystery, are laid bare. Not the least interesting from the purely military viewpoint, are the condensed histories of the war between the allied Bulgar-Serb-Greek armies and that of Turkey in 1912, culminating in the unexpected but crushing defeat of the Turks and of the war that followed so soon between the same allies, in which Serbia added so greatly to her already enhanced reputation as a military power. A study of these short wars is especially worth while now that the same terrain is the scene of heavy fighting. There is also an interesting chapter on the Albanian fiasco, the blockade of the Albanian coast by the international fleet and the occupation of Scutari by detachments from that fleet just following the second Balkan War. The book ends with chapters detailing the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia and the entry of the various powers into the great conflict thus precipitated.

With great skill and care Mr. Gibbons has pictured the conflicting policies of the various powers and the smaller groups; given the salient features of their diplomatic struggles and the open war in which some crises culminated; shown the effect of each clash on the changing map of Europe; and then, with admirable logic, pointed out how seemingly unrelated acts led inevitably to the present war. His work is not only one of exceptional interest but a valuable book of reference. It presents a picture of the last decade of European affairs that is invaluable in approaching the study of the war.



**The Note-Book of an Attache, by Eric Fisher Wood.**

The Century Company. \$1.00 net, 10 cents postage.

One of the most popular books bearing on the personal side of the war is this book of Mr. Wood's. Its chief interest, to the layman, is the freshness of view with which the life of Europe's capitals in war-time is treated. It is evident that Mr. Wood has brought to the treatment of his subject an unusual power of observation and the happy combination of unusual opportunities to capitalize that power. Of chief interest to those who follow the military profession, however, is the lengthy appendix in which the author gives his observations on the differing employment of artillery, infantry, and aeroplanes and other practical phases of warfare as conducted by the various combatant forces, and his analysis of their fighting qualities. These observations, while made by an architect, are of real significance because it is evident, from frequent allusions in the main text, that his observations were checked up and supplemented by those of American military attaches, and

officers of the fighting forces. Mr. Wood, however, falls into the error of assuring his lay readers of the great superiority of American rifle practice as compared to even the best of the nations at war. His assertion that our rifle fire is far superior to that of the British regulars is open to serious question. The chief danger in the assertion, however, lies in its support of the too widespread belief that our regular forces are blessed with a wonderful shooting efficiency. This complacent belief has too long stood in the way of real progress towards preparedness.

Mr. Wood was studying architecture at the Beaux Arts in Paris when war came. He volunteered his services to the American Embassy and was placed in charge of the embassy's supervision over the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians interned in France. On the heels of the Battle of the Marne he visited the terrain in company with two of the military attaches of the embassy, and shortly afterwards skirted the fringe of the fighting at the Battle of the Aisne. Later, as bearer of despatches, he visited Berlin, Vienna, Buda Pest, London, Berne and the Hague.

Because of their undoubted interest, Mr. Wood's observations on the infantry and artillery methods employed by the different combatants are herewith reproduced almost to their full extent.

#### INFANTRY.

My observations lead me to think that the most important qualifications for the infantry soldier are three, viz: to be able to dig, to be able to hide, and to be able to shoot. At the beginning of the war the French had paid very little attention to any of these things. Their men were dressed in a uniform so conspicuous that hiding was impossible. The only shooting that they had ever done was gallery shooting at a range of about forty yards and they were singularly poor even at this. Judging by practical results, they had very few theories and no practice in the matter of digging trenches. The trenches which they made in the early weeks of the war were straight grooves with the earth thrown up in a haphazard manner on either or both sides. Their early defeats were due to the unexpected invasion through Belgium, and to their unpreparedness in the three essentials mentioned above.

The German infantry also shoot poorly from an American standpoint, but do better than the French. Their uniform is the most nearly perfect of any of the armies in the war, and the Germans are virtually invisible at short range if they are not moving. Their helmet is easily the best headgear in the matter of invisibility. It sets tightly on the head, and owing to its shape virtually never casts a shadow. The Germans have been from the beginning very accomplished trench diggers and have had elaborate theories as to the construction of trenches and much practice in making them.

The British are the only troops in the war who shoot with any degree of excellence. Their shooting does not approach in accuracy that of our own army, but it is so superior to the Germans that

a British battalion of 1100 men usually has a firing effect equal to that of nearly 3000. On the gray-green backgrounds of Europe the British khaki is not conspicuous, but at the same time it is certainly visible. The British hat is the most conspicuous headgear in the war, since its rim casts a heavy black shadow, and its flat top shows white in sunlight. The heads of the British in the trenches stand out very distinctly.

In my experience the machine-gun is the most effective infantry weapon. Personally, I should interpret this not as praise for machine-guns, but as a criticism of the poor shooting of all the infantry engaged. The French have comparatively few machine-guns.

The Germans have very well-developed and well-organized systems of relays for their men at the front. The infantry stay in the trenches for about a month at a time and are then given a vacation, usually being sent to their garrison town. Their cavalry serve ten days at the front and are then sent a day's march to the rear for a ten-days' rest. Their artillerymen get no vacation, their lives being considered easy enough.

I saw no evidence of any well-organized system of vacations among either the French or British.

I would mention again, in order to emphasize the statement, that all my observations have led me to believe that the essentials of military preparedness are, first of all, a rapid mobilization, without this everything else is useless. By "rapid" I mean a mobilization of at least half a million men or upward in not more than ten days. After this in importance comes the ability to hide, to dig, and to shoot. To hide is impossible when wearing a uniform as conspicuous as the French, which might be called maximum, and has, I should estimate, been the cause of from three to four hundred thousand extra casualties.

The bayonet has been much used in this war and I have viewed personally a number of battlefields on which the action was decided with cold steel. It is my impression that European officers have maintained their faith in the bayonet as a weapon and some of them may even have become more than ever convinced of its worth. This is very distinctly the case with the French and the Austrians. The Germans are the only people whom I have observed to show any preference for shooting as against cutting when in close action. There is no doubt that the French commander's idea is to win the ultimate decision with the bayonet. Europeans in general seem to

prefer cutting and stabbing to shooting. For them, "fight" seems to mean stabbing somebody. Their psychology is directly opposed to ours, for I think most American soldiers prefer shooting to cutting. The Europeans do not seem to have the taste for shooting, or the ability or wish to shoot well. It is difficult or even impossible to teach many of them to shoot with any degree of effectiveness.

In spite of the degree to which the bayonet has been used in Europe and the number of actions which I have seen won by its use, I am strongly convinced that the bayonet is not a practical weapon, and that the only just grounds for its employment are to be found in psychological reasons.

The French, German, Russian, Austrian, and Hungarian infantry are all armed with long, heavy, and ill-balanced rifles carrying detachable bayonets. These rifles are very poorly sighted in comparison with our new Springfield. It would be very difficult or impossible to do good shooting with them, as measured from an American standpoint. In my personal experience there have been numberless cases where dispatch bearers, automobiles, scouts, pickets, and patrols were exposed at very short range to the fire of bodies of French or German troops without any casualties whatever occurring.

The one idea of the German infantry seems to be to shoot as much and as rapidly as possible. I have several times observed where German infantry have taken up a position in the open, and fired 120 rounds a man, more or less, as a matter of course.

I have nowhere observed the use of any semi-automatic rifles, nor of either silencers or special sights for sharpshooters.

#### ARTILLERY.

I have at all times been tremendously impressed with the dominant importance in this war of artillery. My personal observations lead me to estimate that the percentage of casualties from artillery wounds has been nearly 50 per cent of the total.

There are very distinct differences in the methods of the French and German artilleries. The French field artillery is always used in indirect fire and the positions are usually a long distance behind the infantry—from fifteen to twenty-five hundred yards. The emplacements are often in deep wooded valleys. Too close proximity to the infantry is avoided.

In contrast to this, the German field artillery is nearly always

very close to the infantry and is frequently in position for direct fire. In the most typical German arrangement the infantry trenches are on the front face of a hill along the "military crest" with the artillery two or three hundred yards behind over the natural crest. One often sees German field guns in such a position that it is difficult to say whether they are in "direct" or "indirect" fire.

In battles where there are no rapid retreats and rapid advances it seems to be the custom for batteries to be silent for one or two days while the battery commander, by means of observers, aeroplanes, and spies, endeavors to locate an objective. The importance of observers has become tremendous. On some occasions it seems as though the main object of an army were to get a single man into a location from which he can accurately observe the enemy's position, and as if until this is accomplished the whole battle is at a standstill. Both sides try continuously in all sorts of original ways to get information. The German tendency is toward the use of spies, while the French more often employ daring volunteer observers who sacrifice their lives in order successfully to direct fire for even five or ten minutes. Aeroplanes are used for the same purpose by all nations, but with less and less success as the war progresses, because hostile infantry and artillery are better and better hidden. It has now become almost impossible for an aeroplane to locate hostile artillery except by the flashes. Battery positions are either placed in forests, or artificial woods are built around them. It is almost axiomatic that artillery shall give no signs of life while an enemy's aeroplane is above, and as the result of this, one well-recognized method of temporarily silencing an enemy's battery is to keep an aeroplane flying over its neighborhood. Volunteer observers are frequently disguised and sent forward to hunt for a place from which they can observe the hostile trenches of artillery and thus direct and correct the fire of their own batteries. The French artillery officers take advantage of every "assist"; for instance, I saw a case where a shell made a groove on the reverse side of a hill and glanced off. The shell exploded, but its fuse was recovered by the French, the setting of the fuse determined, and by means of this and the direction of the groove made in the hill the German battery was located. The French reported that they had destroyed the battery. One of their aeroplanes was sent up before firing was begun and later observed the battery's efforts to escape.

The French batteries are usually so far behind the infantry that

when they have come under heavy artillery fire there is no danger of capture. The custom with the French seems to be, in a case like this, for the personnel to run and take cover during the bombardment. I saw this happen twice, and I learned of numerous other cases. Cover underground is constructed for all the personnel of the batteries. One enters these subterranean quarters through entrances which look very much like enlarged woodchuck holes. With no artillery of any nationality did I see any gun entrenchment other than a slight mound of earth coming up to the bottom of the shield. All guns that I have seen were in a line, except in cases where there was some peculiar rising of terrain. I have several times seen a "group" together in one line, at intervals of about twenty yards. In practice, the French tend to extend the intervals to about twenty-five yards, while the Germans either decrease them to about fifteen yards, or have the guns quite isolated, seventy-five or one hundred yards apart.

Telephones are the only instruments of which I have observed the use in the immediate neighborhood of French batteries. The battery commander controls the fire by word of mouth.

The French 75-mm. gun is the only field-piece which under practical field conditions does not "jump." This gives a tremendous advantage to the French artillery in such duels as frequently take place in battles where there is rapid movement. I have been on battlefields after action had finished and observed positions where two batteries had shot at each other, both being in "direct fire" position. The French pieces can fire at a rate of twenty-five shots a minute and in such duels seem to be able to fire accurately with nearly twice the rapidity of the Germans.

I have never observed any "short burst," or shells bursting in guns. I should judge that this accident happens very rarely, with the French, at least.

At the beginning of the war, the French carried shells and shrapnel in about equal numbers. The shells explode with the time-fuse exactly as do shrapnel. From several sources I was told that they were loaded with the new explosive which had been introduced only about three months before the beginning of hostilities. As the war progresses the French tend to use more and more of these explosive shells, which are used against infantry in the same way as are shrapnel. The only difference seems to be that they are made to burst a little lower. Their effect is very terrible. A heavy burst-

ing charge is employed, and although the fragments are small they fly with such force that they make fatal wounds and even cut into the wood of rifle stocks. I observed the body of one German whose back had been pierced with about forty small particles of a shell which had burst close to him. These particles were as evenly spread as the charge of a shotgun. German wounded and captured Germans have told me that this French shell-fire was so hellish that no man escaped except by a miracle. The French infantry have a great affection for their "75," and their confidence is always very greatly increased by its presence. Their spirits immediately rise when they hear it behind them. The French field artillery seem to have no favorite range but readily fire at any range. On the one hand a gun is sometimes taken into the trenches, and on the other hand I once observed a battery firing at 5300 meters and go to 5600 meters. One frequently sees French batteries of two and three guns and groups of eight or nine guns, lost guns not having been promptly replaced. I once saw a battery of two guns, the other two having been completely destroyed by direct fire the previous week. The heaviest piece that I saw at the front with the French was a 6-inch howitzer. The Germans use all sizes up to 12-inch in field operations, the latter being of Austrian construction. I have never discovered any conclusive evidence that Germany possesses 42-centimeter guns.

In my observations, when infantry charge infantry in battle movement, the majority of the casualties are caused by artillery. I have several times observed fields of dead infantrymen killed in an advance against infantry, where 90 per cent of the dead had been killed by shrapnel. In my experience the Germans never use anything except shrapnel against infantry in the open. Shrapnel wounds are very ugly, being big ragged holes which usually become infected.

On the battlefields I have observed, very few German shrapnel have failed to burst in the air. In one field of about a half mile square, where shrapnel cases were strewn about (I counted about forty or fifty), I observed only four craters. The French say that the German shrapnel burst too high.

The German field artillery frequently place their caissons at a distance of two hundred yards behind the guns, there being no limbers or caissons with the guns. The ammunition is brought up by hand, each man carrying six shells in baskets holding three each. The caissons are usually in less numbers than the guns, there being

two caissons behind four guns, or one caisson behind two guns.

On no occasion have I seen observation ladders used by the French field artillery. This is probably due to the fact that, in general, their artillery is at so great a distance behind the scene of operations.

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**Under the Tricolour, by Pierre Mille.**

John Lane Company, New York. \$1.25 net.

**Barnavaux, by Pierre Mille.**

John Lane Company, New York. \$1.25 net.

Pierre Mille, the author of the two books, is known as the French Kipling. Throughout his short stories is strikingly noticeable the influence of Kipling, and one of the short stories, *Victory*, which ends the first collection, is dedicated to Kipling. As Kipling coaxed his Indian stories out of Mulvaney and his mates, Learoyd and Ortheris, by judicious waiting and the lure of opportune drinks, so Mille worms out of Barnavaux, the French marine infantryman, his masterful stories of life in France's wide-flung colonies.

"Barnavaux," so the author pictures him, "who has been three times sergeant, twice reduced for breach of discipline and once for misbehavior. Barnavaux, who has seen so much of the world that nothing now interests him, and who is so full of wisdom that he sleeps when not compelled to work—that is to say, unless he happens to be drinking! \* \* \* He was a colonial infantryman, wearing the red-striped trousers, the heavily-strapped tunic and shiny buttons of his corps. He had a fair beard and a thin face, with bright eyes, and a skin the colour of papier mache: one of the sort called 'die-hards' in those parts because they have indulged in, and survived, every malady under the sun."

In *Under the Tricolour*, the first of Mille's books to be translated into English, there are an even dozen stories with the scenes laid in one of France's Northern Africa outposts, in Madagascar, Zanzibar, the heart of the Congo, the Sahara and the Soudan, Paris and Tonkin, Annam and Toulon. Through the stories of service in the marine or colonial infantry, and in the Foreign Legion, runs Barnavaux's quaint but shrewd philosophy. There is love, war and deviltry of all sorts in these chronicles; yellow fever and a fellow-soldier condemned to life in a leper colony; the saving of an expeditionary column in the Soudan by a thoroughly depraved but quick-witted Parisian Apache; the supernatural reappearance of a sunken

slave ship and its grisly cargo in the Mozambique Channel; the legionary who was once second only to the Chief in the Russian War Office; the battle between the allied Russian and French men-o'-warships who ran afoul of the police in Toulon, and a plenty of humor with which to balance the grewsome incidents of Barnavaux's career under the tricolour.

These and other adventures, some highly diverting, others painted with the grewsome skill in which the French excel, are well worth the reading—and the re-reading. They give an intimate glimpse into what Mille at times refers to as the colonial infantry and at other times as the marine infantry of France.

Barnavaux, the companion volume, finds that veteran as the hero of but four stories in which he is the central figure. In one he tells of the Foreign Legion in which he served for a time. That story is located in the Sahara, while the others take the reader to the Congo, Madagascar and the Senegalese country. The remaining tales, while Barnavaux, to the reader's regret, does not grace their pages, are excellently told stories of life in the Congo, Madagascar and the Far East.

The illustrations of both volumes, done in color by Helen McKie, have caught the spirit of Barnavaux with admirable fidelity.

